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The Courts, the NAS, and the Future 
of Forensic Science 
Jennifer L. Mnookin† 
INTRODUCTION 
On a recent flight, the person next to me on the crowded 
airplane began to chat with me. When I told her about what I 
researched and studied, she looked at me with a big grin. “I 
LOVE forensic science,” she said. “I watch CSI whenever I can. 
They can do such amazing things. It’s all so high tech—and 
incredibly accurate! It’s almost like magic, isn’t it?” She leaned 
in a bit closer and looked at me intently. “Tell me, is it like that 
in real life?” 
I looked at her for a moment before answering. I felt a 
bit like the older child on the playground about to reveal to her 
younger friend that Santa Clause doesn’t really exist. I shook 
my head. “No, I wouldn’t say that CSI’s depiction is entirely 
realistic. In the real world, forensic science isn’t nearly so 
glossy. It isn’t nearly so speedy. And most important, it isn’t 
nearly so foolproof, either.”  
“Really? That’s too bad,” she told me. She looked at me 
directly for a brief moment, shook her head, and then looked 
away. “Well, to tell you the truth, I think I’d rather just keep 
believing in the television version.” Figuring that reality was 
not going to be any match for CSI, I shrugged, and went back 
to the book I was reading.  
In fact, that casual exchange on an airplane captures 
something quite important about the traditional forensic 
sciences, which find themselves at a crossroads. For many long-
used types of forensic science, including fingerprint identification, 
firearms identification, handwriting identification, and toolmark 
  
 † Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This is an expanded and revised 
version of the Belfer Lecture, presented at Brooklyn Law School on April 7, 2009, in 
honor of Professor Margaret Berger’s retirement. Professor Mnookin thanks Margaret 
Berger, Ed Chang, Itiel Dror, Jennifer Friedman, Jay Koehler, and D. Michael Risinger 
for helpful comments, conversations and suggestions. Many thanks to Forrest Havens 
for his helpful research assistance. 
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identification, experts’ claims about their field, the authority of 
their methodologies, and their own abilities have dramatically 
outstripped what has actually been established by persuasive 
research and careful study. Forensic scientists have regularly 
testified in court to matters that are, quite honestly, both less 
proven and less certain than they are claimed to be. They have 
overstated their degree of knowledge, underreported the 
chances of error, and suggested greater certainty than is 
warranted. More generally, many kinds of forensic science are 
not entirely based on the methods and approaches that we 
usually associate with validated research science. Their claims 
and the limits to their claims are not closely based on or 
constrained by the formal collection of data. Their empirical 
assertions are not grounded in careful research that has been 
subject to peer review and publication. There has been 
remarkably little formal validation of their methods. And there 
has been far too little study of how often forensic scientists 
might make mistakes, and when or why these possible errors 
are more likely to occur. Moreover, when academics attempt to 
do research on these questions, they have sometimes faced 
limited cooperation, or even downright resistance, from the 
forensic science community, because practitioners, managers, 
and laboratory directors (as well as police departments and 
prosecutors), are often wary of research not under their 
supervision or control.  
For roughly the last decade, academic critics, and, 
occasionally, forensic scientists themselves, have argued that 
this state of affairs needs to change.1 If we cannot trust the 
  
 1 On forensic science in general, see Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions 
and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007) 
[hereinafter Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions]; Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic 
Science, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 255 (2005); Michael J. Saks, 
Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative Encounters with Forensic 
Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998) [hereinafter Saks, Merlin and 
Solomon]; Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic 
Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 
(2008); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in 
Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (Aug. 5, 2005); Michael J. Saks & 
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy]; 
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA ‘Fingerprinting’ Can Teach the Law 
About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361 (1991). On fingerprint 
evidence, see e.g., SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING 
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001) [hereinafter COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES]; David 
A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 55 (David L. Faigman et al 
eds., 1997); David Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN 
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evidentiary inputs into our criminal justice system, we cannot 
trust the outputs either. Numerous well-publicized wrongful 
convictions have made the danger of error in our criminal 
justice system both more obvious and more salient.2 Recent 
research suggests that misleading and erroneous forensic 
science has been a significant contributing factor in many of 
the known wrongful convictions.3  
  
FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327 (Henry C. Lee & R.E. Gaensslen eds., 2001); Cristophe 
Champod, Fingerprint Examination: Towards More Transparency, 7 L. PROBABILITY & 
RISK 111 (2008); Simon A. Cole, Does ‘Yes’ Really Mean Yes? The Attempt to Close 
Debate on the Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (2005); 
Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 73 
(2003); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings 
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cole, Grandfathering Evidence]; Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and 
Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 39 (2006); Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint 
Evidence Under Daubert, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87 (2007); Jonathan J. Koehler, 
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (2008) [hereinafter Koehler, Proficiency Tests]; Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 
(2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence]; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity 
of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008) [hereinafter Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting 
Moderate]; David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical Analysis of Quantitative 
Fingerprint Individuality Models, 4 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187 (1986) On handwriting 
identification, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of 
Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting Expertise]; D. Michael 
Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped 
Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and ‘Forensic Science’ 
in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 
TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and 
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 21 (1996) [hereinafter Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts]; 
D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a 
Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise’, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). On ballistics evidence, see Adina Schwartz, A Systemic 
Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 
6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005). 
 2 For an early account of the work of the Innocence Project, see BARRY 
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES 
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); see also Brandon J. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An 
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. LAW & 
CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007); The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
 3 Brandon J. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony 
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). For analytic discussions of the role 
of forensic science in wrongful convictions, see, e.g., William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad 
Apples: Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful Convictions, 37 SW. U. L. 
REV. 1027 (2008); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings: Experts 
and Forensic Evidence, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1009 (2008); Jane Campbell Moriarty, 
“Misconvictions,” Science, and The Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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While the danger of erroneous conviction provides both 
a moral and practical perspective on why reliable and valid 
forensic science is so important, ordinary expert-evidence 
doctrine also mandates its validity as a prerequisite for 
admissibility. In 1993, the Supreme Court, in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow, made clear that judges have a gatekeeping 
responsibility with respect to expert evidence.4 In the federal 
courts and in those states that have embraced Daubert, expert 
evidence needs to be sufficiently reliable—meaning, more or 
less, scientifically valid—in order to be legitimately admissible 
in court.5 As a matter of formal evidence doctrine, then, forensic 
science evidence should only be permitted if it meets Daubert’s 
requirements. While Daubert envisioned the judicial 
gatekeeper’s inquiry into reliability as “flexible,” and therefore 
did not set up any absolute criteria for determining the validity 
(and hence admissibility) of expert testimony, the majority 
opinion did provide some important guidelines for trial court 
judges. Specifically, Daubert invites courts to look at whether 
the evidence or technique in question has been tested 
adequately, whether it has a known error rate; whether it has 
been subject to peer review; and whether it is generally 
accepted by the relevant scientific community.6 At this point, 
numerous Daubert challenges have been made to many kinds 
of forensic science, from fingerprint evidence, to ballistics 
analysis, to handwriting examination.7 But with a small 
  
 4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  
 5 Justice Blackmun stated that the “inquiry” into the admissibility of expert 
evidence is “a flexible one,” whose “overarching subject is the scientific validity—and 
thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a 
proposed submission.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.  
 6 Id. Daubert’s approach was expanded upon in G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 135 
(1997) and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 7 For examples of courts permitting forensic science under Daubert or the 
state equivalent, see United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that latent fingerprint identification methods satisfied the standards of reliability set 
forth by Daubert); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 574, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1998); 
see also United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding shoeprint 
analysis to satisfy the Daubert standard); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 233, 
250 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009) 
(finding firearm identification evidence to satisfy the Daubert standard); State v. 
Foreman, 954 A.2d 135 (Conn. 2008); United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 79 (1st 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Prime, 363 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
handwriting analysis satisfies the Daubert standard); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 
261, 271 (4th Cir. 2003); Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781, 796 (Miss. 2003) (finding 
that bite mark analysis satisfies the Daubert standard). For a list of Daubert 
challenges to fingerprint evidence (but current only through 2005), see http://onin.com/ 
fp/daubert_links.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). For the argument that courts have 
been less intense in their Daubert scrutiny in criminal cases than in civil, see, e.g., D. 
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number of exceptions, courts have continued to permit these 
kinds of evidence without limit.8  
The truth of the matter is that for the last decade, both 
judges and the forensic science community have chosen to 
behave rather like my acquaintance on the airplane. They 
prefer to play a kind of make-believe; they prefer to believe in 
the television version.  
In what follows, I aim to do three things. First, in Part I, 
I will provide a brief overview of the present state of affairs 
within forensic science, focusing on latent fingerprint evidence 
and the concerns that have emerged regarding the adequacy of 
its research basis. Second, in Part II, I will discuss a recent and 
significant report issued in February 2009 by the National 
Academy of Sciences regarding the needs of the forensic science 
community.9 I will suggest that this report, though impressive 
in many ways, gave too little attention to how the courts ought 
to handle the admissibility of pattern identification evidence. I 
wholeheartedly agree with this report’s assertion that it is 
imperative that we create substantially more funding for 
research and government oversight and regulation of forensic 
science. But this alone will not be enough, nor is it likely even 
to happen at all, unless courts also begin to take their 
responsibilities in this area more seriously. In Part III, I will 
look closely at how the courts have confronted (or, more 
accurately, mostly avoided confronting) the present problems 
relating to forensic science evidence in recent years. I will 
describe the approaches, mechanisms and machinations by 
which numerous courts have failed to treat their 
responsibilities to assess the validity of forensic science 
  
Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty 
Being Left on The Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).  
 8 There have been a small handful of cases that have restricted forensic 
science evidence, at least to some extent; this issue will be discussed in detail infra 
Part III.C. See, e.g., Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; United States v. Green, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 104, 124 (D. Mass. 2005); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73 (D. 
Mass. 2002); United States v. Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Penn. 2002) 
(overruled by Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002)); Maryland v. Rose, 
No. K06-0545 (MD Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007). Expert evidence in handwriting 
identification has been scrutinized more carefully by courts than have the other forms 
of pattern identification evidence, and this scrutiny has sometimes led judges not 
merely to limit but to exclude it altogether. For a thoughtful account of the current case 
law in this area, see D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in FAIGMAN, 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1; D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the 
Reliability of Handwriting Identification Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. 
REV. 477 (2008) [hereinafter Risinger, Cases Involving].  
 9 STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD (The National Academies Press 2009) [hereinafter NAS Report].  
1214 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
evidence with adequate care, and I will also describe the 
approaches taken by the few courts who have addressed the 
issues seriously. This section also offers the first detailed 
scholarly analysis of an approach taken by a handful of 
thoughtful jurists with respect to forensic pattern evidence, in 
which they continue to admit the evidence but only in a 
weakened, limited form—specifically, they permit the expert to 
describe similarities and differences between exemplars, while 
excluding the experts’ ultimate conclusions about 
identification. This section describes why that approach, 
though superficially quite appealing, is far less conceptually 
coherent than it appears, though I recognize that it may 
nonetheless remain an attractive, pragmatic, stop-gap measure 
for courts wrestling with these difficult issues. Finally, in Part 
IV, I describe what a serious judicial examination of forensic 
pattern identification evidence ought to entail, what questions 
judges should focus on under Daubert v. Merrell Dow, and what 
demands they should make as a prerequisite to admissibility in 
court. I suggest that outright exclusion may, in some cases, 
indeed be warranted, and should certainly, along with more 
modest measures, be part of the available judicial toolkit.  
A few brief preliminaries are needed to provide context 
and background. First, it is important to recognize that these 
concerns are not merely abstract or theoretical. In fact, a recent 
study of wrongful convictions found that flaws with forensic 
science—including interpretive errors, overstated testimony, 
and inaccuracies—were present in a whopping 60% of the cases 
studied.10 To be sure, many of the forensic science errors found 
  
 10 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 3, at 19 n.62. In the case of microscopic hair 
analysis, it is important to distinguish those cases in which forensic scientists engaged 
in misstatement, overstatement, and unjustified assertions from those cases in which 
the inherently limited sensitivity of the technique means that in retrospect, the jury 
likely made an incorrect inference from the forensic evidence. Practitioners of 
microscopic hair identification have never formally claimed an ability to identify an 
individual from a hair; at most, a hair can be said to be “consistent” with a source, 
which means only that it is a member of a class of hairs that could possibly have come 
from that source, not that the hair necessarily came from that source. In this sense, it 
is more like blood typing—e.g., “this blood is type A, and so is the defendant, so the 
defendant is not excluded from the group of people who are possible sources for this 
blood” than it is like DNA profiling or fingerprinting. In my opinion, if a microscopic 
hair examiner provided only this kind of “class” evidence, including the defendant (or 
other relevant person) as a possible source among other possible sources, it ought not to 
be considered a forensic error, even if subsequent evidence shows the defendant not to 
be the perpetrator. It is as if the (innocent) defendant, the blood sample, and the actual 
perpetrator all had Type A blood—for the serologist to have testified that the 
defendant’s blood type matched the crime scene was not erroneous, though to be sure, 
the inference of guilt the jury drew from that fact combined with the other evidence 
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in the study related to techniques that play a less significant 
role as legal evidence than they once did, such as microscopic 
hair examination (which now most frequently functions as an 
adjunct to mitochondrial DNA testing of hairs instead of 
standing alone as it used to do).11  
However, to intimate that therefore these past errors 
and mischaracterizations no longer matter is to miss a critical 
point. While mitochondrial DNA testing can now often operate 
as a check on microscopic hair analysis, the broader forensic 
science ‘culture’ which made these earlier instances of error 
possible remains very much intact. This forensic science 
culture—a culture in which claims derived from experience are 
often accepted as a substitute for data; a culture in which 
interpretations are often framed in absolute terms rather than 
in more limited or modest language; a culture in which 
potentially biasing information is not systematically kept from 
the forensic examiner; and a culture in which institutionally 
cozy relationships between detectives, forensic analysts, and 
prosecutors may encourage unconscious partisanship—remains 
very much the norm within forensic science laboratories today. 
It is, in the end, this culture that needs to change; new and 
improved forensic techniques will not, by themselves, provide 
an adequate solution.  
Second, even though I certainly do wish to criticize the 
current paltry research basis of forensic science and the courts’ 
response to that reality, I also want to emphasize several 
important caveats. Forensic professionals are, for the most 
part, just that—hard-working, dedicated, and trying their best, 
often with quite inadequate funding. Though there are, 
unfortunately, more than a handful of known instances of 
forensic fraud, these incidents are the exception and not the 
  
was erroneous. By contrast, when, as was all too often the case, microscopic hair 
analysts claimed or intimated that the defendant was the source, or provided fictitious 
frequency estimates for hair types, or claimed the hairs “matched” without making 
clear that numerous other peoples’ hair in any given population would also match, this 
would, in my view, certainly count as forensic error. For examples of forensic error, see 
generally id. I thank Barry Scheck for useful conversations on this point that clarified 
my thinking, even if we continue to disagree on some definitional points. 
 11 See, e.g., Cary T. Oien, Forensic Hair Comparison, Background 
Information for Interpretation, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2009, available at http://www. 
fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/april2009/review/2009_04_review02.htm; SWGMAT (Scientific 
Working Group on Materials Analysis), Forensic Human Hair Examination Guidelines, 
7 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2005, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/ 
april2005/standards/2005_04_standards02.htm#p11 (pointing out that microscopic hair 
analysis and DNA often complement one another). 
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rule.12 Most forensic scientists are both diligent and honest. My 
criticisms of the field should not be heard as criticisms of all 
those who pursue it. Furthermore, the lack of an adequate 
research basis for the claims of the pattern identification 
sciences is not the fault of practicing rank-and-file forensic 
scientists themselves, most of whom have neither the training 
nor the background to pursue such research effectively even if 
they wanted to do so. These practitioners should—and indeed 
must—become, to some extent, the subjects of research inquiry, 
but they are not to be faulted for failing to become empirical 
researchers themselves.  
Third and finally, even though I strongly believe that 
forensic science needs to be placed on a more secure research 
foundation, I do not want to suggest, or to be heard to suggest, 
that it is therefore of no value. In fact, with most of the forensic 
sciences, my strong suspicion is that when we do finally insist 
on pursuing the necessary research, we will find that many 
kinds of forensic evidence presently in use turn out to be 
extremely probative, and very much worth hearing in court. In 
many fields, my prediction would also be that the error rate, 
even with the methodologies in use at present, will turn out to 
be tolerably low for a wide array of pattern identification tasks, 
though I am far from confident this will turn out to be true in 
all fields, or in all situations. But for now, these expectations 
are mere speculation—the critical point is that it is time to 
pursue research that will help us find out for sure. What we 
have, at present, is no more and no less than an absence of 
adequate evidence. This lack of evidence does not in and of 
itself prove the inadequacy of the methods used by forensic 
scientists. But we can, should, and therefore must, seek better 
evidence establishing the validity of these techniques, 
methodologies, and conclusions, so that we can have greater 
legitimate confidence in the forensic sciences we use in court, 
and thus better understand their possible limits and 
weaknesses as well.  
  
 12 See generally Keith A. Findley, Innocents At Risk: Adversary Imbalance, 
Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893 (2008); Jennifer 
L. Mnookin, Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings: Experts and Forensic Evidence, 47 
SW. U. L. REV. 1009 (2008); Thompson, supra note 3; Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of 
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y. & L. 439 (1997); Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions, supra note 1; 
Moriarty, supra note 3. For examples of forensic fraud, see, e.g., Forensic Fraud, 
http://www.corpus-delicti.com/forensic_fraud.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (detailing 
many such cases).  
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I. FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE AND THE LIMITS OF OUR 
KNOWLEDGE 
In what follows, I focus primarily on latent fingerprint 
identification, but it is important to realize that I could tell an 
extremely similar tale about a variety of other kinds of forensic 
science, including firearms identification, handwriting 
identification, bitemark identification, toolmark identification, 
and the like. Fingerprint evidence is, in all likelihood, both 
more probative and less error-prone than some other kinds of 
forensic identification evidence, and it has a long and 
extremely substantial courtroom use. It therefore provides an 
especially good focus, for if the problems I am describing exist 
within this forensic domain, they are likely to be equally or 
more acute in other areas of pattern identification.  
Fingerprint evidence was first used in the American 
courtroom nearly a century ago in 1911, and for most of its 
history it has been seen as the “gold standard” of forensic 
science. In recent years, however, whatever metal out of which 
this evidentiary standard was made has rather noticeably 
begun to tarnish.13  
The basic approach taken by latent fingerprint experts 
involves what they call ACE-V. This acronym stands for 
analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification.14 First, in the 
analysis step, the examiner looks closely at the latent print 
associated with the crime at issue, and decides whether there 
is enough useful information contained in the image that it is 
“of value” for further examination.15 If so, the examiner then 
looks carefully at the various minutiae that he or she sees in 
the image, and, depending on local practices and the apparent 
difficulty of the print, typically marks up the print and 
documents the minutiae she observes.16 Second, in the 
comparison stage, the expert compares the latent print to a 
  
 13 For the history of fingerprint identification and its legal use, see generally 
COLIN BEAVEN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND THE MURDER 
CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE (2001); COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES, supra 
note 1; Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprint Evidence and 
Expert Knowledge, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 687 (1998); Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, 
supra note 1.  
 14 For a description of each stage, see, e.g., Michell Triplett’s Fingerprint 
Dictionary, available at http://www.nwlean.net/fprints/a.htm. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Herman Bergman & Arie Zeelenberg, Fingerprint Matching, 
Manual, in Encyclopedia of Biometrics (Anil K. Jain & Stan Z. Li., eds), at 502-04 
(2009).  
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particular source print, noting both observed similarities and 
differences.17 Third, the analyst evaluates these similarities and 
differences, and reaches one of three, and only three, 
conclusions: identification, exclusion, or inconclusive.18 Note 
that these are the only permissible options available to a latent 
fingerprint expert—a match, a non-match, or a conclusion of “I 
don’t know.” “Maybe,” “possibly,” and “probably,” are not 
determinations presently permitted to fingerprint examiners 
under their professional rules and norms.19 Finally, in the 
verification step, if the first examiner has determined that the 
prints match, a second examiner takes the prints and goes 
through the same process to re-analyze them. In most 
laboratories, this step is conducted by an examiner who is 
informed of the original examiner’s conclusion before 
undertaking his or her own analysis.20 This verifying examiner 
typically recognizes both that (a) he or she is verifying a 
conclusion already reached by someone else; and (b) that the 
conclusion already reached is that the prints do match.  
Latent fingerprint examiners regularly claim that ACE-
V is a version of the scientific method and assert that it offers a 
reliable methodology that establishes that fingerprint evidence 
is indeed a valid science.21 Many courts have agreed that ACE-
V passes muster under Daubert.22  
  
 17 The comparison print may have been to a known suspect, or to a non-
suspect known to have been in the relevant location. Or the latent print may be 
submitted for an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database search, 
which compares the latent to a large database (depending on the particular database, 
often many millions of images) and returns a set of possible prints for human 
comparison. For some of the difficulties with interpretation of match thresholds in 
AFIS searches, see Itiel Dror & Jennifer Mnookin, The Use of Technology in Human 
Expert Domains: Challenges and Risks Arising from the Use of Automated Fingerprint 
Identification Systems in Forensic Science, 10 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming, 
2010).  
 18 For descriptions of these permitted conclusions, see SWGFAST (Scientific 
Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology), Standard for 
Conclusions, http://www.swgfast.org/Standards_for_conclusions_ver_1.0.pdf.  
 19 Note that at its 2009 annual meeting, the International Association of 
Identification (IAI), the professional organization of fingerprint examiners, considered 
eliminating the longstanding professional restriction on testifying in probabilistic 
terms. However, the motion was the subject of significant contention and was tabled 
for further study. 
 20 The FBI has begun to conduct some verifications “blind,” meaning that the 
verifier does not recognize that he or she is verifying a conclusion reached by another 
examiner. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint 
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 
706, 715 (2004).  
 21 See, e.g., Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent Prints: A Perspective on the State 
of the Science, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 2009, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/ 
fsc/current/review/2009_10_review01.htm. Numerous fingerprint examiners have 
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In fact, ACE-V’s relationship to the scientific method is 
tenuous at best: as a methodology, it amounts, more or less, to 
having two different examiners look carefully at a set of 
fingerprints. To be sure, the “scientific method” is itself a 
complicated and capacious idea, not altogether easily or 
adequately defined. But however we might define the critical 
characteristics of the scientific method, it surely amounts to 
more than simply careful, semi-structured observation. At root, 
ACE-V in its current incarnation amounts to no more and no 
less than a set of procedures to describe the careful comparison 
of a latent print with a potential source print by an initial 
examiner and a subsequent verifier. While careful observation 
and the recording of one’s observations may be a necessary part 
of many scientific practices, careful observation in and of itself 
cannot be meaningfully said to constitute a method. Moreover, 
the simple act of labeling this process of careful observation as 
a methodology does not make it into one. Nor does bestowing 
upon it the label “scientific” tell us, through the moniker, 
anything about its likely validity or error rate.23 
The basic difficulty is that ACE-V is too general in 
conception and scope to provide much in the way of guidance or 
constraint for those who practice it. The devil is in the details—
what constitutes analysis? How exactly does a competent 
comparison take place? When are apparent similarities 
misleading, and when might apparent differences be attributed 
to something other than the two prints deriving from different 
sources? ACE-V, as a methodology, does not help answer any of 
these critical methodological questions, because its categories 
are too general and insufficiently substantive.24  
It is as if one were to describe the methodology for fixing 
a car by the acronym DACT—Diagnose, Acquire, Conduct, and 
Test. We could describe the DACT car-repair methodology as 
  
described ACE-V as corresponding to the scientific method. See e.g., Mary Beeton, 
Friction Ridge Identification Process—Proposed Scientific Methodology, THE DETAIL, 
Feb. 18, 2002, available at http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/1-99/TheDetail 
28.htm. 
 22 See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261; United 
States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Markham v. State, 984 A.2d 262 
(Md. App. 2009); Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. App. 2004). 
 23 For the argument that the point ought not to be whether fingerprint 
evidence is or is not scientific, but rather, how to improve it, see Itiel E. Dror, How Can 
Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four Idols of Human Biases, 50 
JURIMETRICS J. 93 (2009).  
 24 See generally Haber & Haber, supra note 1. 
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follows: (1) diagnose the car’s problem, (2) acquire the 
necessary parts for the repair, (3) conduct the repair, and (4) 
test to verify that the repair fixed the problem. Whether or not 
such a car-repair methodology actually works, or how well it 
works, would depend entirely on the content given to these 
very broad categories in specific instances. If in fact, someone 
diagnosed the car’s problem correctly, located the appropriate 
parts, and conducted the repair properly, the methodology 
would work. But if the mechanic misdiagnosed the difficulty, 
acquired the wrong parts, or made an error when conducting 
the repair, the repair would fail, even though he or she had, in 
some sense, followed the methodology. Now, in light of the 
failed repair effort, a defender of ACE-V (and DACT) might 
suggest that the mechanic had not in fact followed DACT 
correctly, because he or she misdiagnosed the problem, made 
an error in the repair, or made some other mistake in 
application. The DACT defender might even argue that the 
mechanic’s failure to fix the car established that she failed to 
follow DACT; that following DACT necessitates doing the steps 
correctly, not just endeavoring to follow them. But that 
response would render DACT (or, analogously, ACE-V), in 
some sense, merely tautological. The method does not describe 
with any specificity how to complete its requirements correctly. 
It is therefore illegitimate to argue that the method has not 
been followed simply because the desired outcome did not 
occur, precisely because the method itself underspecifies what 
is required. DACT itself does not explain how to diagnose, or 
what constitutes a sufficient repair, just as ACE-V does not 
explain how to analyze or compare (beyond calling for careful 
looking at a target portion of each print), or what constitutes a 
sufficient evaluation.25 To be sure, ACE-V might be a useful 
description of the basic steps a fingerprint examiner takes in 
order to conduct his or her examination, but that does not 
make it a very useful description of a methodology, much less a 
so-called “scientific method.”  
  
 25 I am presently a member of an NIST/NIJ working group on Human 
Factors in Latent Fingerprint Examination. As part of this working group’s efforts, 
fingerprint examiners put together a process map describing the ACE-V process in 
more careful detail than had ever previously occurred. While the process map is useful 
in many ways, it also makes my point here clear: although the process map delineates 
numerous steps, and diagrams in detail the steps necessary for conducting a 
comparison, the actual interpretive content of terms like “sufficiency,” “identification,” 
etc., are never actually specified, because at present, the fingerprint community does 
not have shared definitions of these concepts.  
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Surely, one would think, ACE-V in practice must 
amount to more than I am suggesting? Latent print examiners 
do have norms about what kinds of print ridge detail and 
minutiae they ought to be looking at, and examiners are 
trained to search both for relevant minutiae and to assess their 
contextual relationship and position on a fingerprint.26 And 
latent print examiners do discuss with one another, informally, 
their personal notions regarding sufficiency, or the virtues and 
limitations of different categories of print information.27  
While individual examiners or even sometimes 
laboratories may develop working rules of thumb about the 
quantity of similarity required, latent fingerprint examination 
as a field lacks any formalized specifications about what is 
required in order to declare a match. There is no required 
minimum number of points of resemblance or minimum 
number of total print features, nor any required quantum of 
any specific kind of ridge detail.28 Instead, examiners decide for 
themselves, based on their training and experience, how much 
similarity is sufficient to declare a match. Moreover, when 
examiners look at a print, they may not even be focusing on the 
same features. Two fingerprint analysts will often focus on 
different minutiae in their examination of the same print; 
indeed, sometimes the same examiner, when given the same 
print at a different time, will focus on different minutiae than 
  
 26 Level 1 detail describes the major pattern of the print, whether it is, say, a 
tented arch or a loop. Level 2 detail, which constitutes the main focus for comparison 
and evaluation for most examiners, refers to the ridge quantities, details, and 
characteristics, such as whether and where a friction ridge bifurcates, or terminates, or 
develops a spur. Level 3 detail refers to sub-ridge detail, for example sweat pores that 
may be visible in an image. 
 27 Fingerprint examiners, though, do not all agree that it is useful to divide 
the field into precisely three different levels. See supra note 25. Though the terms are 
often used in the United States, examiners in the UK do not typically focus on these 
categories, and there are diverging opinions on how to define and how to make use of 
Level 3 detail, for example. See the definitions of Level 1, 2, and 3 detail in Michelle 
Triplett’s Fingerprint Dictionary, supra note 14 (available at http://www. 
nwlean.net/fprints/l.htm); see generally DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-
QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED 
RIDGEOLOGY (1999). 
 28 Indeed, the IAI (International Association of Identification) resolved in 
1973 that there was no scientific justification for having a specified minimum number 
of points of similarity in order to declare that two prints matched. See Report of the 
Standardization Committee of the International Ass’n for Identification, 
IDENTIFICATION NEWS, Aug. 1, 1973, available at http://www.latent-prints.com/images/ 
IAI%201973%20Resolution.pdf. For further discussions of this point, see generally 
Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1; Simon A. Cole, What 
Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 139 (1999) [hereinafter Cole, What Counts for 
Identity?]. 
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he or she did the first time.29 The judgment is fundamentally a 
subjective one, not based on any formalized measures of either 
quantity or sufficiency.30  
Additionally, latent fingerprint examiners do not 
generally employ any statistical information or models in the 
ordinary ACE-V process. The field presently does not have or 
make use of robust statistically-based data about the frequency 
of different friction ridge characteristics. Analysts do not make 
regular or structured use in their comparisons of empirical 
studies showing how common or how rare different fingerprint 
details might be. They do not presently make use of any 
statistically-validated standards to justify how many 
identifying characteristics must be the same on two prints in 
order to warrant a finding that they match. Nor do they employ 
a probabilistic approach to determining the likelihood that a 
print selected at random would have that quantum of 
similarity, akin to the use of “random-match probability” in 
DNA identification. Although significant strides are being 
made toward developing these kinds of information, technical 
obstacles still limit the ability to develop a satisfactory 
statistical measure of the frequency of various ridge 
characteristics.31 As of now, there simply is no well-accepted, 
fully-specified statistical model that is available for latent 
fingerprint examiners to employ. 
The list of difficulties continues. A fundamental tenet of 
latent fingerprint analysis is the “one discrepancy rule”—if 
there is even one genuine discrepancy between the latent print 
and a potential source print, then the two prints cannot have 
come from the same source.32 This, however, invites the critical 
question of how to decide what constitutes a discrepancy, as 
  
 29 Itiel E. Dror et al., Cognitive Issues in Fingerprint Analysis: Inter- and 
Intra-Consistency and the Effect of a ‘Target’ Comparison (unpublished article, under 
review at FORENSIC SCI. INT’L) (on file with author). 
 30 See generally id.; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 
supra note 1; Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 1; Saks, Merlin and Solomon, 
supra note 1; Cole, What Counts for Identity?, supra note 28. 
 31 One quite promising approach is being developed by a group of European 
researchers. See, e.g., Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in 
Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. OF 
FORENSIC SCI. 54, (2007); J.S. Buckleton, C.M. Triggs & C. Champod, An Extended 
Likelihood Ratio Framework for Interpreting Evidence, 46 SCI. AND JUST. 69 (2006). 
While a version of software implementing this team’s approach to providing 
probabilistic likelihood ratios is likely to be available soon, its adequacy and validity is 
not yet fully established.  
 32 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf; Triplett’s Fingerprint Dictionary, supra 
note 14. 
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opposed to a dissimilarity that can legitimately be explained in 
some other way. The problem is that no two print impressions 
are ever truly identical—every single impression from a print 
is distinct from every other impression of a print, different to 
some extent even from those that came from the same source. 
A print image can be affected by the pressure with which it was 
left, the surface on which it was made, the processes by which 
it was lifted, and many other factors. The question when 
comparing two prints, then, is not whether they are truly 
“identical”—for they will never be truly identical—but rather, 
whether they are sufficiently similar to each another to permit 
the conclusion that they came from the same source. The 
examiner needs to determine whether apparent differences are 
true dissimilarities, or instead, merely artifacts that ought not 
to be deemed meaningful. Unfortunately, latent fingerprint 
examiners lack any formalized criteria for determining when a 
difference between two prints is genuinely a dissimilarity, or 
when it might appropriately be explained in other ways. At 
root, this is again a matter of subjective judgment by the 
trained examiner. 
Note, however, that the fact that these judgments are 
subjective does not necessarily imply that they are incorrect or 
unreliable. If I were to look at many different photographs of 
my sister, no two images of her would be identical. And yet, my 
judgment of whether any given photograph was an image of my 
sister or actually an image of someone else bearing a certain 
degree of resemblance to my sister would, I would wager, have 
a high probability of being correct. I would posit that my ability 
to identify images containing my sister, and to avoid 
misidentifying images of other people as my sister would be 
quite high—notwithstanding my lack of formal criteria for 
doing so. The absence of formal, validated standards for 
making such identification of my sister does not mean that I 
lack all relevant knowledge. My experience of many years of 
seeing my sister in a great variety of contexts would indeed 
likely help me with the identification tasks.  
However, I also suspect that my ability to identify my 
sister in photographs would be strong but not perfect. In some 
images, she might be too far away, or too blurry, or someone 
else might bear such a strong resemblance to her, that despite 
my life-long knowledge of her from every angle, I might 
nonetheless mistake the other person for my sister. Or 
conversely, I might fail to recognize that some picture truly did 
show an image of my sister. Of course, to determine how often I 
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was right or wrong, we would also want to make sure we had a 
good method by which to determine “ground truth,” whether or 
not the photograph truly was of my sister.  
The purpose of this analogy is to suggest three points 
that apply as much to fingerprint identifications as to my 
hypothetical efforts to identify my sister. First, I want to 
suggest that experience can be a legitimate basis for 
knowledge. Second, I want to suggest that knowledge need not 
necessarily be formalized to count as legitimate or valid. 
However, and this is the third point, if we wanted to find out 
just how good my ability to recognize my sister in photographs 
really was, we would need to depend on something that went 
beyond my say-so. We would not want simply to take my word 
for it when I said I was good at the task. We would not want to 
take the simple fact of my extensive experience looking at my 
sister as proof of my identification talents. Nor would we want 
to blindly accept my opinion that particular photos actually 
were or were not of my sister.  
Instead of taking my say-so, my experience, and my 
conclusions as proof of my accuracy, we should carefully test 
my actual proficiency at the tasks. We would need to 
investigate empirically just how well I did identify my sister; in 
what array of circumstances I succeeded; and when and how 
often the task proved beyond my capacity. Indeed, as I will 
argue below, an equivalent focus on serious, careful proficiency 
testing of practitioners is precisely what we ought to demand in 
the realm of forensic science as well. Just as we would want 
proficiency testing to verify my claimed experience-based 
ability to identify my sister, so we also ought to require 
significant proficiency of fingerprint examiners and other 
pattern identification analysts. 33 And just as we ought not to 
simply take my assertions about my conclusions’ accuracy as 
proof of actual accuracy, we ought not to take fingerprint 
examiners’ experience-based assertions of accuracy as proof of 
accuracy either.34 
  
 33 See infra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing proficiency tests for 
fingerprinting). 
 34 One important issue is feedback: if I do make mistakes in identifying my 
sister, am I likely to know about them? Do I receive feedback on my accuracy that could 
permit me to learn from my errors? If not, we should be especially skeptical of my 
assertions of accuracy based on experience, for if my experience is not likely to provide 
me with information about when and where I went wrong, I may not be able to learn 
all that much from it. This is clearly a concern with the pattern identification sciences 
as well, in which the opportunities for learning from feedback are quite limited. (The 
situation may be even worse than one in which there is no feedback; the trial process 
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Returning now to latent fingerprint examination, there 
are two additional difficulties with the current state of 
knowledge and practice. First, fingerprint experts claim to be 
able to individualize—to connect a given print to a unique 
source. When they declare a match, they assert that two prints 
come from a common source to the exclusion of all other possible 
sources in the world. This is an astonishingly strong claim.35 A 
latent fingerprint examiner who individualizes is saying that 
he or she can connect this print to one particular finger of one 
single person, out of everyone in the world, everyone who has 
ever lived or will ever live. But there is quite simply a lack of 
empirical evidence establishing that they can actually do what 
they claim.36 To be sure, both experience and some empirical 
research does suggest that fingerprints are highly varied.37 But 
even if fingerprints themselves are unique, this does not 
necessarily mean that experts can make unique identifications 
from partial latent prints, using their methods and expertise. 
Evidence of uniqueness does not itself directly support the 
experts’ claims that they are able to individualize.38 
  
may provide erroneous or misleading feedback in the case of forensic errors, precisely 
because forensic science evidence is often considered to be so strong. For example, if an 
expert makes an erroneous fingerprint identification that leads to a conviction or a 
guilty plea, that could be seen by the expert as confirming the correctness of the call, 
when in fact the erroneous identification may have substantially produced the 
conviction.) 
 35 Champod, supra note 1. Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy, supra 
note 1; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 139-40; 
Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 992-93 (2005) [hereinafter Cole, 
More than Zero]. See generally Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, 
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic 
Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, Forensics Without 
Uniqueness]. 
 36 NAS Report, supra note 9; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting 
Moderate, supra note 1; David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could 
Individualize Using Statistics?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC’Y 197, 197 (1991); Saks & 
Koehler, Individualization Fallacy, supra note 1. 
 37 See, e.g., an unpublished study cited and described in United States v. 
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004) as the 50k study, designed to show the 
tremendous variation in fingerprints. But for a strong critique of this study, see David 
H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INT’L 
STAT. REV. 521 (2003). 
 38 See generally Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 1; Mnookin, 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1. Think again of my sister in the 
photograph, discussed supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. That every person 
really is unique does not mean that every photographic image will be a sufficiently 
clear depiction to permit a unique identification, or that my sister-identification talents 
will be strong enough to succeed in all circumstances. Even if every person (or every 
fingerprint) is indeed unique, the question is whether the image and the methods used 
to analyze it are capable of discerning that degree of difference.  
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Nonetheless, experts claim this ability as well as frequently 
asserting 100% certainty in their own conclusions. In fact, they 
are prohibited under their professional norms from making 
probabilistic judgments, and are subject to possible sanction if 
they do not follow this professional rule.39 They are told and 
taught that they must either be absolutely certain, or reach no 
conclusion at all. There are no shades of grey permitted—
notwithstanding that fundamentally, fingerprint matching 
ought to be thought of as a probabilistic inquiry.40  
How often do fingerprint examiners make mistakes? 
Well, in court, until quite recently, experts frequently testified 
that their technique had a “zero error rate.”41 Some examiners 
tried to divide their analysis of error rate into two parts—the 
error rate of the technique itself, and the error rate of the 
humans who use it. They acknowledged that it was possible for 
a human to make a mistake, though they asserted (again 
without any significant published research) that errors are 
exceedingly rare. They claimed that the technique, if used 
properly, is perfect and error-free. Mistakes result only when 
humans misapply it.42  
This notion of an error rate of zero is exceedingly 
unscientific. It borders on the meaningless, and is a far cry 
from how scientists typically think about error rates. Nothing 
is truly perfect—no human endeavor has an error rate of zero. 
Moreover, the distinction between the error rate of the 
technique and the error rate of the humans who use it is, 
frankly, nonsensical with regard to fingerprint identification. 
The human beings engaging in ACE-V are the technique. The 
appropriate question is the error rate in practice, not an in-the-
clouds theoretical error rate that postulates perfect human 
  
 39 See generally SWGFAST Standards for Conclusion, supra note 18; supra 
text accompanying note 19. 
 40 Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1; Cole, 
More than Zero, supra note 35, at 992; Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, supra note 
35, at 235. However, there is ongoing discussion in the fingerprint community about 
whether to modify or eliminate this rule. See supra text accompanying note 19; Stacey, 
supra note 20, at 715. 
 41 The FBI’s Steven Meagher was perhaps the best known example of an 
expert who regularly testified in this vein. See, e.g., Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 222-26 
(discussing Meagher’s testimony); see also, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68 
(Me. 2006) (zero error rate argued in footwear identification case, drawing on latent 
fingerprint for support and by analogy); Havvard, 260 F.3d 597; Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 492.  
 42 See, e.g., Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 222-26 (discussing Meagher’s testimony); 
Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492; see also Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting 
Moderate, supra note 1; Cole, More than Zero, supra note 35, at 1050.  
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beings and then concludes that so long as these perfect human 
beings make no mistakes, the error rate is zero. We could just 
as easily say that in theory, eyewitness identification has an 
error rate of zero because faces are in fact different—
notwithstanding the fact that in practice, eyewitness 
identification errors are distressingly common.43 This claim of 
an error rate of zero is an example of how the rhetoric of 
forensic sciences is often shaped for courtroom use rather than 
derived from valid scientific testing designed to produce the 
most accurate possible information.44  
If the actual error rate is not zero, then how often do 
fingerprint examiners make mistakes? The truth is that we 
really do not know. Although fingerprint examiners may, at 
times, undergo proficiency tests, these exams have for the most 
part been extremely easy, far easier than the kinds of 
challenges that can be faced in actual casework.45 A fingerprint 
examiner from Scotland Yard once, under oath in court, 
referred to the FBI’s proficiency tests as a “joke” because of 
how ridiculously easy they were.46 Furthermore, in some 
laboratories, examiners take their proficiency tests in groups 
rather than individually. In addition, proficiency tests are 
generally not conducted blind, as part of what appears to the 
examiner to be ordinary casework.47 Rather, examiners are 
usually aware they are being tested, and may therefore, 
consciously or unconsciously use a different degree of care than 
usual.48 Thus, in their current form, proficiency tests might be a 
check on gross individual incompetence, but they certainly 
provide nothing more, and given that the examinations may be 
done collectively and not blind, they may not even necessarily 
provide that.  
We do know that errors sometimes occur, though it is 
impossible on the basis of what we presently know to attempt 
  
 43 See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN 
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); ELIZABETH 
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).  
 44 See Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 
137; see also Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 1, at 1727.  
 45 See Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 
135-36; Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092; Cole, More than Zero, supra 
note 35, at 1032. 
 46 Llera Plaza (II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549. 
 47 Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092; Mnookin, Confessions of a 
Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 136.  
 48 Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1, at 1092.  
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to quantify their frequency.49 One particular fingerprint error—
perhaps the monster of all fingerprint errors, the most high-
profile, embarrassing fingerprint mistake in recent history, at 
least here in the United States—has contributed to shaping 
and framing the discourse surrounding latent fingerprint 
identification.50 This mistake was sufficiently public, serious, 
and embarrassing that it led to a substantial inquiry into its 
causes; more generally, it made the fingerprint community—
and the legal community—recognize that fingerprint errors 
were not simply a matter of incompetence or an issue of purely 
academic concern.51 I am referring, of course, to the mistaken 
identification of Brandon Mayfield, an attorney from Portland, 
Oregon who was held as a material witness in relation to the 
2004 Madrid train bombing. The only evidentiary basis for 
suspecting his involvement was an alleged fingerprint match. 
Mayfield’s print had been one of the possible source prints 
suggested by a computer database search using an AFIS 
(Automated Fingerprint Identification System). Mayfield’s 
print appeared fourth down on the computer-generated list of 
suggestions—and according to the FBI, his print was a definite 
match.52 
Mayfield insisted that the identification had to be a 
mistake. He told authorities he had never set foot in Spain, had 
remained entirely in the United States during the relevant 
period, and indeed, lacked a passport. But three separate 
fingerprint examiners at the FBI, including two of the most 
respected senior examiners in the office, all concluded that the 
match was 100% certain. Even an independent, court-
appointed expert confirmed the match as well.53  
  
 49 For an effort to describe the array of known errors, see Cole, More than 
Zero, supra note 35. 
 50 The ongoing saga in the United Kingdom relating to Shirlie McKie might 
offer the Mayfield case some competition.  
 51 This increased awareness, openness, and a certain increased willingness to 
confront the limitations of the field, may indeed be the “silver lining” of the Mayfield 
case. See Jennifer Mnookin, Op-Ed., The Achilles’ Heel of Fingerprints, WASH. POST, 
May 29, 2004, at A27.  
 52 Editorial, The F.B.I. Messes Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004 at A22.; see 
generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006), 
http://www.justice gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
 53 Les Zaitz, Transcripts Detail Objections, Early Signs of Flaws, THE 
OREGONIAN, May 26, 2004, at A1; Andrew Kramer, Fingerprint Science Not Exact, 
Experts Say, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 21, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/5032168; see also Steven T. Wax & Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of 
Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, 28 THE CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 6; OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON MAYFIELD (2006), http://www.justice.gov/ 
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The Spanish authorities were less convinced, and after 
several weeks, located another suspect, an Algerian named 
Ouhnane Daoud, in a different database, who, they claimed, 
was the actual source of the print. Eventually, the FBI 
concurred. The FBI was deeply embarrassed, Mayfield was 
released from custody, and eventually received compensation of 
$2 million.54 
What happened? I will mention just two of the most 
important causes of the error. First, one portion of one of 
Brandon Mayfield’s prints really does bear a striking 
resemblance to one portion of one of Ouhnane Daoud’s fingers.55 
There is no doubt that portions of the two prints are extremely 
similar, and the resemblance between Mayfield’s finger and the 
portion of the image most clearly visible on the latent recovered 
from Madrid was, as it happens, particularly strong. How often 
are we likely to see such a high degree of resemblance in prints 
from different sources? No one really knows. The Inspector 
General’s report, an independent investigation conducted in 
the aftermath of the scandal, insists that this degree of 
similarity is extraordinarily rare.56 Perhaps so, but the truth is 
that we do not actually know how common or rare that degree 
of apparent similarity may be. It is clear that the growing size 
of the databases used for fingerprint analysis increase the risks 
of misidentifications like this one.57 Latent fingerprint 
examiners, at present, do make regular use of AFIS systems, 
computerized databases to generate a set of possible matching 
prints—possible “cold hits” based on a fingerprint match. But 
the computer algorithms are far from perfect, and thus the 
computer search process alone cannot determine whether any 
of the possible prints actually match. Only the examiner, using 
ACE-V to compare each AFIS suggestion to the latent print, 
can make that determination. As the databases grow, so grows 
the possibility of highly similar near-misses like Brandon 
Mayfield’s—fingerprints so similar that they might fool even 
crack fingerprint experts. 58 
  
oig/special/s0601/final.pdf; Mnookin, Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra 
note 1; Cole, More than Zero, supra note 35; Stacey, supra note 20. 
 54 Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will Pay $2 Million to Lawyer Wrongly Jailed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at A18.  
 55 OIG REPORT, supra note 52 at 6-7. 
 56 Id. at 7. 
 57 Dror & Mnookin, supra note 17, at 55-56. 
 58 Id.  
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In addition to the unexpected degree of similarity 
between the prints from different sources, it appears that 
cognitive bias also played a role in the debacle. Immigration 
lawyer Mayfield was a Muslim; he had converted to Islam some 
time earlier.59 He had also once represented a known terrorist 
in a child custody dispute. While it appears that the FBI 
investigators did not know these facts about Mayfield when 
they first determined that his print matched the one found on 
the detonation materials in Madrid, their subsequent 
awareness of this information made them more reluctant to 
reopen the issue or contemplate the possibility that they had 
made an error. More generally, even apart from this contextual 
information, it seems that once the first FBI examiner declared 
the prints to match, the verifying examiners expected to find a 
match. It is no great surprise, then, that they found precisely 
what they expected to find, likely the result of a mixture of peer 
pressure and expectation bias.60  
This problem of biasing information goes well beyond 
the Mayfield debacle. Forensic experts frequently have access 
to information about a case that goes beyond whatever 
information is actually necessary for their forensic testing. 
They may be told by detectives or investigators about other 
powerful evidence linking the suspect to the crime. They may 
be told details about the suspect that bear no relation to the 
pattern identification evidence itself—that he is a known gang 
member, or that she has prior convictions, or that he has 
confessed, or that this match is critical because it is the only 
strong evidence in the case. No information of this kind bears 
in any way on the actual forensic science inquiry, and risks 
creating an unconscious biasing effect on the examiner. Indeed, 
in most scientific fields, there is a careful and often formalized 
effort to shield researchers from this kind of contextual 
information.61 It’s too dangerous. We human beings have a 
cognitive tendency to see what we expect to see. Think of the 
way that medical researchers make use, whenever possible, of 
carefully controlled studies to ensure that not even the treating 
physicians know who is receiving the medication under 
investigation and who may be getting the placebo. These 
  
 59 OIG REPORT, supra note 52. 
 60 See generally Stacey, supra note 20; Noelle Crombie, FBI Blamed in Print 
Error, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 16, 2004, at A-1; OIG report, supra note 20. 
 61 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2002).  
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protections exist to protect physicians from unconscious bias 
that might influence their interpretation of the effects of either 
the medicine or the placebo. Currently, in the forensic sciences, 
there are generally no such procedures to protect examiners 
from extraneous information that may have an unconscious 
influence on their findings.62 
To be sure, some information, though potentially 
biasing, may nonetheless be necessary for conducting the 
forensic test. A fingerprint examiner, for example, will likely 
need to know what surface a print came from, notwithstanding 
that the information may provide context clues about the crime 
itself. The point is not that examiners should lack all access to 
non-forensic information relating to the case. Rather, to the 
maximum extent practicable, they should only be given the 
case-related information that is actually relevant and helpful to 
their forensic inquiry. Dan Krane and others have coined the 
name “sequential unmasking” as a label for this approach, in 
order to emphasize that forensic analysts ought to learn only 
that information that they actually need, and only when they 
actually need it. All information, in other words, should be 
unmasked—that is to say revealed—to the examiner in 
sequence, and only when it is necessary.63 The examiner should 
have access to all the information necessary to do his or her 
analysis effectively—no more, and no less.  
The concern about the danger and power of biasing 
information is not simply theoretical. In a clever experiment, 
cognitive psychologist Itiel Dror used the Mayfield case to show 
the possibility of contextual bias effects on fingerprint 
examiners’ interpretations. A small handful of fingerprint 
examiners were each given a pair of prints, a latent print and a 
potential source print, and told that they were the prints from 
the Mayfield case. Each examiner was asked to evaluate 
whether or not the prints matched, using only the information 
contained in the print.64  
  
 62 See generally id; see also, e.g., Michael J. Saks et al., Context Effects in 
Forensic Science, 43 SCI. & JUST. 77 (2003).  
 63 Dan Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer 
Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI., letter to the editor, 1006 
(2008); see also Risinger et al., supra note 62; William C. Thompson, Subjective 
Interpretation, Laboratory Error and the Value of Forensic DNA Evidence: Three Case 
Studies, 96 GENETICA 153, 167 (1995). 
 64 Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to 
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, 74, 76 (2006).  
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In fact, however, unbeknownst to the examiners, the 
prints were not the Mayfield prints. Each examiner was 
actually given a set of prints that he or she personally had 
previously testified in court were a 100% certain, positive, 
error-free individualization. But now, when provided with this 
biasing contextual information suggesting that the prints were 
those involved in the Mayfield scandal, 60% of the examiners 
(three of the five examiners tested) reached the opposite 
conclusion, determining that the two prints in front of them did 
not in fact match.65 A fourth examiner judged the prints to be 
inconclusive.66 Only one of the five examiners reached a 
conclusion consistent with his or her original judgment that the 
prints matched.67 To be sure, the Mayfield incident was a 
significant scandal, so the potential biasing effect of this 
context information was obviously quite extreme. Nonetheless, 
given some fingerprint experts’ insistence that their 
methodology is not vulnerable to unconscious bias or general 
human fallibilities, Dror’s findings generated a great deal of 
interest and a certain amount of both surprise and anxiety 
within the fingerprint community.68 The experiment was, in a 
sense, a possibility proof, showing that bias could indeed, at 
least in some circumstances, be significant enough to affect 
examiners’ conclusions. Follow up experiments by Dror and his 
collaborators on a larger number of examiners and with less 
starkly biasing information still revealed the potentially 
biasing effect of contextual information on analysts’ 
judgments.69  
From one perspective, these findings are quite 
unsurprising. Research across a variety of other fields shows 
that we are all potentially biased by context and expectation.70 
Given that, why should we be in the least surprised that 
forensic science is no different than other cognitive enterprises? 
  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id.  
 68 Sue Russell, Bias and the Big Fingerprint Dust-Up, MILLER-MCCUNE, 
June 18, 2009, available at http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/bias-and-the-
big-fingerprint-dust-up-3629/.  
 69 Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 600, 606, 612-14 (2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-
Analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 900 (2008); see also Schiffer & Christophe Champod, The Potential 
(Negative) Influence of Observational Biases at the Analysis Stage of Fingermark 
Individualization, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, 116 (2007).  
 70 See generally Risinger et al., supra note 62, and the many sources cited 
therein.  
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The recognition that fingerprint examiners are potentially 
subject to bias does not mean that they are behaving 
unprofessionally, or being careless, or not trying hard enough. 
Cognitive biases are an inherent danger of our cognitive 
architecture.71 That forensic scientists are not immune to them 
is hardly a surprise—except, perhaps, to those forensic 
scientists who were committed to a conception of their 
infallibility.  
Dror’s studies do make absolutely clear that bias is not 
simply a theoretical concern but a practical one as well. 
Moreover, they reveal that at least in some circumstances, 
biases may be acute enough to affect forensic examiners’ 
outcome judgments. These studies therefore suggest both the 
theoretical and practical importance of taking concrete steps to 
limit examiners’ access to biasing information. To be sure, 
these studies are preliminary, and involve only a relative 
handful of examiners. Nonetheless, these studies, coupled with 
all that is already known about bias in other cognitive 
domains, strongly suggest that this area should receive 
significant further study, so that we can better understand how 
and when bias poses a danger, and how often bias may be 
strong enough to affect an examiners’ conclusions. There is also 
a significant need to identify the mechanisms that could 
usefully reduce those biasing effects that cannot be eliminated.  
Furthermore, as law professor Michael Risinger has 
pointed out, the limited forensic science research on biasing 
effects to date ought not to be taken as an excuse for inaction.72 
We know enough right now that we ought not to require 
further research before taking all reasonable action to reduce 
bias effects. The existing forensic-oriented studies, albeit 
limited in number and preliminary, coupled with the far more 
substantial research in other domains revealing human beings’ 
cognitive vulnerability to bias, should reverse the burden of 
proof: unless the forensic science community can establish that 
it does not need blinding protocols, masking procedures, or 
other mechanisms that would reduce or eliminate bias, we 
should assume that bias-reduction mechanisms are indeed 
already warranted by our current degree of knowledge.73 
  
 71 Id. 
 72 D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass 
Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009) 
[hereinafter Risinger, A Glass Nine-Tenths Full].  
 73 See generally id.  
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II. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY REPORT ON THE STATE OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE  
For those who closely follow the debates in forensic 
science, much of what I have described up to this point will 
have been quite familiar. But for those who began reading this 
Article believing in the television version, so to speak, the 
significantly more complicated reality may have come as 
something of a surprise. I hope I have, in this whirlwind tour, 
left those of you who walked with great confidence in the 
reliability of fingerprints at least a bit unsettled. 
Unfortunately, for the most part, the same cannot be said for 
the courts.  
Beginning around a decade ago, enterprising attorneys 
began bringing admissibility challenges to fingerprinting, 
drawing to the courts’ attention the kinds of problems and 
weaknesses I have just described. But nearly all of these 
challenges failed. One lone court did actually exclude 
fingerprint evidence in 2007, calling it “a subjective, untested, 
unverifiable identification procedure that purports to be 
infallible.”74 But although that case parroted what had 
practically become conventional wisdom in certain academic 
circles, as a legal decision it was a voice in the wilderness. 
Every other trial judge who has considered the admissibility of 
latent fingerprint identification since Daubert has found it to 
meet the applicable standard for the admissibility of expert 
evidence. It has been, for the most part, too hard for judges to 
contemplate excluding a form of evidence that has been 
routinely used for nearly a hundred years. For those academics 
engaged in constructive criticism of the forensic sciences, 
reading these judicial opinions has often felt like walking in a 
house of mirrors. As I will describe in more detail below, 
evidence of the problems facing forensic science would often be 
ignored, distorted, or recast, in order to help courts avoid 
  
 74 Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Balt. County Cir. Ct. 2007), available at 
http://www.latent-prints.com/images/State%20Of%20Maryland%20vs%20Bryan%20 
Rose%20K06-0545.pdf. However, that decision did not stand. A federal judge 
overturned the admissibility call, saying “fingerprint identification evidence based on 
the ACE-V methodology is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, has 
a very low incidence of erroneous misidentifications, and is sufficiently reliable to be 
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 702 generally and specifically in this case.” United 
States v. Rose, No. CCB-08-0149, 2009 WL 4691612, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 8, 2009). 
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confronting the insufficient research basis supporting these 
forms of evidence.75 
Meanwhile, late in 2005, partly at the request of the 
leadership of the forensic science community itself, Congress 
commissioned the well-regarded, independent, and non-
partisan National Academy of Sciences to research and write a 
report on the needs of the forensic science community. In 
February of 2009, the long-anticipated report was issued.76 
This report was written by an interdisciplinary panel of 
distinguished scholars and practitioners, who conducted their 
own investigation into the state of the research, and also heard 
numerous days of testimony from a substantial number of 
leading forensic science professionals, researchers, and others 
knowledgeable about the state of the forensic scientists.77 This 
panel included scientists from a variety of fields, several 
forensic professionals, and some with legal experience.78 The 
panel also included one law professor: Brooklyn Law School’s 
own Margaret Berger, in whose honor this Festschrift volume 
of the Law Review has been written. In essence, the 319-page 
report substantially confirms the views of the academic critics 
about the inadequacy of the research basis to support many of 
the claims routinely made by forensic scientists.79  
For example, the report finds that there is not an 
adequate basis for claims of individualization. The report also 
finds “a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies 
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic 
methods.”80 The report claims that research on proficiency, 
performance, and the role of bias and observer effects is “sorely 
needed.”81 All in all, “[t]he present situation . . . is seriously 
wanting, both because of the limitations of the judicial system 
  
 75 See infra Part III. 
 76 NAS Report, supra note 9.  
 77 In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I provided oral 
commentary to the NAS panel during their process. 
 78 The make-up of the committee has been criticized by the forensic science 
community for having insufficient practitioners. It is interesting to note that the 
committee in fact had several forensic practitioners, while it had not a single member 
who had already published critical work concerning the adequacy of the research basis 
of forensic science. For more information on the committee and its make-up, see 
generally D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path 
Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 79 NAS Report, supra note 9. 
 80 Id. at 5-6. 
 81 Id. 
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and because of the many problems faced by the forensic science 
community.”82 
The report’s boldest and perhaps most important 
recommendation is for the creation of a new independent 
federal agency to regulate, supervise, and improve the forensic 
sciences. This agency, dubbed the National Institute of 
Forensic Science (NIFS), would be responsible for funding 
research to improve forensic sciences; it would also be 
responsible for establishing and developing best practices, and, 
more generally, supporting and overseeing the forensic science 
infrastructure.83 One academic has quipped that the NIFS 
would be “a mixture of the SEC and the NSF” for forensic 
science, rather an apt characterization.84 The report explains in 
detail that no other existing agency has, in the committee’s 
view, the ability effectively to provide all of what forensic 
science needs in terms of both research management and 
regulatory oversight.85 No existing agency—neither NIST, the 
NIJ, nor anyone else—has, according to the report, the 
necessary expertise, resources, and appropriate political 
culture to permit it to perform this array of functions credibly 
and successfully.86  
The report makes a number of other significant 
recommendations. It calls in strong terms for additional 
research to establish the validity and reliability of forensic 
sciences, as well as research to examine the extent of biases 
and observer effects.87 It calls for mandatory laboratory 
accreditation and mandatory individual certification of forensic 
scientists (right now both are entirely optional).88 Significantly, 
it calls for the use of incentive funding to motivate states to 
make their crime laboratories independent from law 
enforcement and prosecutors.89  
The report has received a good deal of attention both 
from within the forensic science community and from outsiders. 
As of now, several hearings on Capitol Hill have been held to 
  
 82 Id. at 5-9. 
 83 Id. at 5-14. 
 84 Roger Koppl, Professor of Econ. & Fin., Farleigh Dickinson Univ., Remark 
at a Forensic Science Conference at Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law (2009). 
 85 NAS Report, supra note 9, at 5-24. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 5-18. 
 88 Id. at 5-19. 
 89 Id. at 5-17. 
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consider its recommendations.90 President Obama has created a 
forensic science task force to consider how to proceed.91 But the 
unfortunate reality is that now, roughly a year after the report 
was issued, almost no one believes that NIFS is going to be on 
the horizon any time soon. A new federal agency seems to be 
neither fiscally nor politically viable.  
Overall, the NAS report is an impressive achievement, 
and both its criticisms and suggestions are, in my view, 
generally on the mark. However, I do have one relatively 
significant quarrel with the report, which relates to its 
treatment of the legal aspects of forensic science and 
admissibility. The report offers a thorough and trenchant 
critique of how the courts have thus far handled forensic 
science. It describes how the courts have substituted long use 
for an actual focus on proven validity.92 It points out the ways 
in which judges have been “utterly ineffective” at honestly 
assessing the research basis of the pattern identification 
sciences.93 I agree completely. The report further contends that 
the judiciary, particularly given judges’ lack of training in 
science, the case-by-case nature of the adjudicatory system, 
and the limits of appellate review, cannot be expected to solve 
this problem on its own. “Judicial review, by itself, will not cure 
the infirmities of the forensic science community.”94 Again, I 
wholeheartedly agree. 
But then, at this key point, the NAS report decides to 
punt. After offering this significant critique of the judiciary’s 
actions, the report is distressingly silent about what the 
judiciary ought to do next. If judicial review by itself will not 
and cannot solve our problems in the forensic science arena, 
does it nonetheless have some role to play? While we await 
NIFS, or any other significant federal initiative vis-à-vis 
forensic science; while we await the necessary research that we 
hope will eventually be done; while we await greater regulation 
and the possibility of mandatory accreditation, what should 
  
 90 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), webcast available at http://judiciary. 
senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4038. The Congressional Subcommittee on 
Technology and Innovation also held a hearing on March 10, 2009 and the Judiciary 
Committee also held a hearing on May 13, 2009.  
 91 The National Science and Technology Council in the Office of the President 
of the United States created a Subcommittee on Forensic Science. For details, see 
http://projects.nfstc.org/trace/2009/presentations/7-melson-stolorow-nas.pdf. 
 92 NAS Report, supra note 9, at 5-9.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 12. 
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judges do? Sit idly by, and continue permitting pattern 
identification evidence as they always have? While providing a 
good deal of persuasive authority to any judge who wishes to 
scrutinize forensic science with more care, the NAS report does 
not offer any specific guidance whatsoever for courts wrestling 
with admissibility determinations under Daubert.  
Understandably, the committee may have thought that 
sweeping statements about admissibility were unwarranted, 
and more generally that telling judges how to behave would be 
overstepping its mandate. I fully recognize that the NAS report 
was directed at Congress and was not primarily intended for 
the courts. But the committee might have done more. For 
example, while the report says there is no scientific basis for 
claims of individualization, it does not go one step further and 
explicitly say that such testimony ought therefore to be deemed 
objectionable.95 The report says that a zero error rate is not 
scientifically plausible, but it does not explicitly say that 
testimony asserting such a rate should therefore be viewed 
with skepticism.  
To be sure, these are easy inferences to draw from what 
the report does say. If Daubert says that expert evidence needs 
to be established as reliable and valid, and a court accepts the 
NAS report’s conclusion that a zero error rate is not 
scientifically plausible, then it might be a simple matter of 
syllogistic logic to conclude that any claim of a zero error rate 
does not pass Daubert. And there is no doubt that the report is 
already being cited by defense attorneys in the latest round of 
Daubert motions that are, inevitably (and, in my view, quite 
appropriately) being spurred by the report’s contents and 
conclusions.  
But there is, in the report, a certain sense of 
resignation, perhaps even fatalism, about the courts. There is a 
tone that suggests that the committee may have thought that 
the judiciary has done such a poor job of gatekeeping in this 
area that it is hard to imagine the possibility of change.96 To 
have faith in the courts’ capacity to make an about-face in this 
domain is, perhaps, the mark of a naïve optimist, or maybe 
even a chump. 
While I agree with the report that courts alone cannot 
and will not prompt the necessary reforms to forensic science, 
  
 95 Id. 
 96 See generally id.  
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it also seems to me that courts absolutely do need to be part of 
the solution. For courts to continue to treat forensic science 
evidence in the same manner that many of them did prior to 
the NAS report would be worse than cowardly. The NAS report 
strongly suggests that the concerns expressed in recent years 
by a number of academic critics were neither overstated nor 
illegitimate. The academic critics were not crackpots, nor were 
they Chicken Littles worrying about something that no one else 
could see because it wasn’t really there. There truly is an 
insufficient basis in research for many of the strong claims that 
forensic scientists have been making for years. The courts 
should squarely confront that fact and decide in a thoughtful 
way what consequences it creates for these forms of evidence; 
what effects it has on admissibility; and whether it means that 
the evidence should, at a minimum, be limited, and if so, how.  
Admittedly, the question of whether fingerprint 
evidence should pass Daubert or the equivalent test under 
state law is a difficult one. Fingerprint evidence has been used 
in court for roughly one hundred years. There is no doubt that 
the pattern variation among human friction ridges is indeed 
enormous, and that fingerprints, whether or not they are truly 
unique, certainly have extremely significant discriminatory 
power. Fingerprint evidence is quite obviously probative. 
Moreover, people trust it. Not just “people”—not just the 
proverbial man in the street, not just forensic scientists 
themselves, not just prosecutors. Even those of us—like me—
who are sometimes viewed as critics of fingerprint evidence 
acknowledge its probative power.97 For example, if you asked 
me which piece of evidence I would have more confidence in, an 
eyewitness identification by a crime victim of the perpetrator, a 
stranger who was viewed for a short period of time by the 
victim during a stressful crime; or a latent fingerprint 
identification of an individual made from several high-quality, 
clear latent prints found in a location and in circumstances 
strongly suggesting that whoever left the print was connected 
to the crime, my honest answer would be the fingerprint 
identification. All of these facts make it extremely difficult for a 
court to seriously and deeply consider the possibility of 
excluding, or even limiting, this form of evidence.  
  
 97 Indeed, even Simon Cole and Michael Saks, two of the staunchest so-called 
critics, both recognize that fingerprint evidence has a great deal of power. See, e.g., 
Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 1, at 1193-94; Saks, Merlin and Solomon, 
supra note 1, at 1106. 
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And yet, in a way these facts about the power of 
fingerprint evidence are beside the point, or at least they do not 
adequately and fully answer the question of fingerprint 
evidence’s legitimate admissibility in court. The problem with 
fingerprint evidence is not that it completely lacks probative 
power, but rather that research on the domain has not yet 
established the appropriate limits to its probative power, or 
shown how that value varies depending on its quality or its 
quantity of information. It is as if I wanted to sell you a 
valuable jewel and the question was how much it should cost. 
We may both agree that the jewel is indeed valuable, but the 
right question is not whether it has value, but just how 
valuable it is, and just how we can know its appropriate value. 
If I refused to research that question, or even to permit any 
research on the specific characteristics of the jewel that would 
help assess its precise value, and I further refused to research 
the relevant market information to help determine its 
appropriate price, I would have an extremely hard time selling 
the jewel, and legitimately so. If all I said was, “Of course it’s 
valuable. We both know it’s simply the most valuable jewel in 
the world. I’m not going to investigate the question of its 
precise value, but we both know it’s virtually perfect. Let’s 
therefore just agree that it’s worth an extraordinary amount 
and price it accordingly,” we would both expect you to walk 
away from the potential sale.  
Fingerprint evidence, like that jewel, is obviously 
valuable. But like that jewel, we should be wary of ‘buying’ it 
as legal evidence in court until we have a better, research-
based understanding of precisely how valuable it is, and 
whether there are instances in which we might be assuming it 
to have a significantly higher value than it really does. Without 
careful proficiency testing of examiners, without information 
about what the significance of any given ‘match’ really is, 
without error rate information about the frequency and 
circumstances of mistakes, without understanding which 
fingerprint identifications are easy and which ones are more 
difficult and hence more likely to be error-prone, we should be 
cautious buyers indeed. Quite possibly, the better strategy 
might be simply to forego the purchase until more of the 
necessary information is available. Still, recognizing this 
somewhat awkward state of affairs—that we have a form of 
evidence that obviously often has probative power, but also has 
a strikingly inadequate research basis—helps, I think, to make 
sense of the courts’ reluctance to exclude, or in some 
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circumstances, even honestly to engage with the arguments 
made by defense counsel. 
III. HOW HAVE THE COURTS ANALYZED THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF FINGERPRINTS? 
In the remaining portion of this article, I will explore 
both what courts have actually done when confronted with 
challenges to the admissibility of pattern identification 
evidence, as well as what they ought to do. First, I will focus on 
what they have done, and then turn to what they ought to do, 
but it may be valuable to preview my suggestions about what 
they ought to do before turning to look at how courts have 
actually responded to the numerous pattern identification 
admissibility challenges that have arisen.  
My bottom line is straightforward: Forensic science 
experts should not continue to be given free rein to testify in the 
manner they have typically done up until now. Judges need to 
develop a variety of thoughtful approaches—a toolkit of sorts—
with which they can assess admissibility, and this toolkit 
should absolutely include outright exclusion in some 
circumstances. What judges ought to do may well not be the 
same across the board, even within the same field—as Kumho 
Tire v. Carmichael98 indicates, and as Michael Risinger has 
usefully emphasized,99 the court’s responsibility when assessing 
the admissibility of expert evidence is to focus on “the task at 
hand”—which means looking closely at the specific nature of 
the claims being made in the particular circumstance. This 
means that we may not be able to achieve—nor may we 
necessarily want—a one-size-fits-all admissibility approach to 
any given form of pattern identification evidence. Admissibility 
determinations, and the scope of permissible testimony, may 
depend on the details—is it a single partial latent from AFIS, 
or are there nine extremely clear latents corresponding to three 
different fingers of the defendant? What is the quality of the 
print or prints in question? What specific claims is the expert 
trying to make, and how absolute are the conclusions 
presented? These questions, and others like them, ought to 
inform judges’ analyses. All pattern identifications are not 
  
 98 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 99 See generally D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-
Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
767 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”]. 
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created equal, and a blanket approach to admissibility, pro or 
con, is not likely to be warranted.  
Nonetheless, at a bare minimum, given currently 
available knowledge, courts ought not to permit evidence of 
either individualization or a zero error rate. Even the forensic 
science community is beginning—slowly and in the case of 
individualization somewhat falteringly—to recognize that these 
claims are perhaps better let go.100 But I would go further. In 
many cases involving pattern identification, courts have, as of 
now, only two legitimate choices if they are to take Daubert 
seriously: either (1) limiting the evidence by restricting it to 
description of similarities and differences, rather than offering 
opinions; or (2) outright exclusion. One alternative is to greatly 
restrict the expert’s testimony, limiting it to description of 
similarities and differences without any evidence providing an 
interpretation of these similarities and differences. This option, 
though superficially appealing, raises some thorny 
admissibility concerns which are hard to avoid in a principled 
way, as I will describe below. Nonetheless, it seems acceptable 
as an imperfect, interim solution for courts who simply find it 
too hard to exclude evidence that likely does have significant 
probative value. The second approach, and one that deserves 
far more serious consideration than most courts have been 
prepared to give it, is outright exclusion. 
While that may sound like an extreme reaction—cutting 
off the patient’s arm when perhaps it could have been put in a 
cast and saved—it is important to note, as I will argue below, 
that with a modicum of effort on the part of researchers and 
forthright cooperation from the forensic science community, 
exclusion would be quite short-lived. As I will argue in Part IV, 
  
 100 On February 19, the President of the IAI, Bob Garrett, issued a two-page 
statement to its membership stating, “Although the IAI does not, at this time, endorse 
the use of probabilistic models when stating conclusions of identification, members are 
advised to avoid stating their conclusions in absolute terms when dealing with 
population issues.” Though the wording is perhaps slightly opaque, this is, in essence, a 
pulling back from an absolute claim of individualization. See http://www. 
theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_memo_20090219.pdf (last visited April 17, 2010). 
However, a month later, in written comments prepared for the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the IAI backed off from this claim, and in a significantly longer document 
(7 pages of remarks), pointedly said nothing about individualization, whether 
conclusions can be absolute, or how to think about population issues. See 
http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/nas_response_leahy_20090318.pdf (last visited 
April 17, 2010). For another example of a staunch defender of the reliability of pattern 
identification science suggesting that, for instrumental rather than epistemic purposes, 
claims of individualization should be dropped, see John Collins, Stochastics—The Real 
Science Behind Forensic Identifications (2009), Crime Lab Report, available at 
http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/monthly_report/11-2009.htm.  
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courts’ primary focus under Daubert should be on the question 
of whether the expert’s claims have been subject to adequate 
testing—whether there is evidence that supports the claim that 
the expert can actually do what she says she can do. Complete 
knowledge of the cognitive practices of fingerprint evidence; a 
validated statistical model of ridge characteristics and 
frequencies; even objective standards for determining whether 
or not prints match—all of these forms of knowledge would be 
valuable, beneficial, and are absolutely worth pursuing, but 
they need not exist in order for latent fingerprint evidence to be 
legitimately admissible under Daubert. What courts really 
ought to consider requiring, in many cases, as a minimum 
prerequisite to admissibility is simply much better error rate 
information about examiners’ abilities in practice. And 
producing this information is eminently achievable with 
concerted focus and effort.  
I turn, now, to what courts have actually done when 
confronted with admissibility challenges to fingerprint 
evidence and other kinds of pattern identification evidence. Up 
to the present, courts wrestling with these admissibility 
challenges have offered several categories of arguments and 
made certain repeated intellectual moves. In this Part, I will 
describe three dominant analytic approaches that courts have 
taken: (1) the ostrich maneuver, (2) the ACE-V conclusion 
(where ACE-V stands, in this case, for “Admissible—
Considering Everything, it’s Valid (enough));” and (3) the 
Solomonic compromise. 
A. The Ostrich Maneuver: Problem? What Problem?  
The first approach taken by some courts when 
confronting challenges to the admissibility of pattern 
identification evidence is what I call the ostrich maneuver, 
because these courts appear to be trying desperately to keep 
their heads in the sand. Certain judges have, to a sometimes 
remarkable extent, averted their eyes to the quite legitimate 
concerns about the research basis supporting the conclusions 
offered in the pattern identification sciences. These judges have 
more or less asked, “Problem? What problem?” An archetypal 
example of the ostrich maneuver occurred in United States v. 
Havvard.101 The judge’s view of the issue was captured early in 
  
 101 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000). Though Havvard is an especially 
dramatic “ostrich” opinion, it is certainly not the only one. See, e.g., United States v. 
 
1244 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
his written opinion finding that fingerprinting passed Daubert, 
when he wrote, “The court’s decision may strike some as 
comparable to a breathless announcement that the sky is blue 
and the sun rose in the east yesterday.”102  
The judge went on to explain why, in his opinion, fingerprint 
evidence posed virtually no genuine difficulty under Daubert. 
He concluded, for example, that fingerprint evidence could be 
relied upon because it had indeed been tested (testing being 
one of the most important factors under Daubert) “in 
adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes—
liberty and sometimes life.”103 Note the judge’s slippage here—
Daubert envisions scientific testing, not courtroom testing. In 
fact, the entire purpose of Daubert—a heightened reliability 
screen for expert evidence—derives from the idea that the 
crucible of the courtroom is, by itself, an insufficient check on 
validity and reliability for scientific and expert evidence. If 
testing through adversarial proceedings were enough, then a 
separate judicial inquiry into reliability would be entirely 
superfluous.104 We wouldn’t need Daubert at all, because the 
crucible of the courtroom would suffice. Notwithstanding the 
  
Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. 2001); State v. Cole, 2002 WL 1397452 (Del. Super. 
2002); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171, 2001 WL 1635494 (C.A.4 (N.C.) 
2001). 
 102 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).  
 103 Id. at 854.  
 104 To be sure, one could make the argument that we do not actually need a 
special judicial check on validity and reliability for expert evidence. One could possibly 
defend this claim on a variety of grounds, ranging from (1) an argument that 
adversarial testing through the presentation of contrary evidence and cross-
examination are in fact an adequate method for evaluating expert evidence; to (2) that 
there may be little evidence that judges’ evaluation of the legitimacy of expert evidence 
is epistemically superior to that of juries, in which case using them as a ‘reliability’ 
screen for evidence might be epistemically ineffective and, therefore, potentially 
usurping the power of the jury for no legitimate purpose; to (3) that we do not engage 
in strong validity checks on other kinds of potentially unreliable evidence and there is 
an insufficient institutional or epistemic justification for treating expert knowledge 
differently, etc. But none of these arguments—whether or not they have any 
intellectual merit—provide a legitimate basis for a lower court within our legal 
hierarchy to argue that ‘adversarial’ testing constitutes testing of the sort envisioned 
by Daubert. A judge could make a more subtle argument that adversarial testing is 
adequate for “shaky but admissible” evidence. Daubert says, and indeed the judge in 
Havvard quoted, later in his opinion: “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Havvard, 117 F. 
Supp. 2d at 854 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596). 
But while the power of adversarial testing might be an argument for permitting 
borderline evidence (and indeed, is a contributing argument to the ACE-V approach to 
these questions discussed below, infra notes 114-128 and accompanying text), 
adversarial testing should not be understood as the kind of testing referred to and 
expected by Daubert.  
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sleight of hand at work in Havvard with respect to the idea of 
testing, adversarial testing simply cannot legitimately be seen 
as fulfilling Daubert’s idea of testing.  
The judge engaged in a similar, though less egregious, 
sleight of hand with respect to the peer review and publication 
factors of Daubert. He granted that the “publication” factor was 
an awkward fit for fingerprint evidence because it had been 
developed “for forensic purposes,” but found that adversarial 
testing offered an adequate substitute.105 He also found that 
there was plenty of peer review, both because of the practice of 
having one examiner verify the conclusions of another, and also 
because any examiner could review the conclusions of any peer 
by taking her own look at the prints in question.106  
Is the verification stage of ACE-V akin to peer review? 
It is true enough that having verification as a standard practice 
does provide a certain degree of routine peer examination for 
each declared fingerprint match. But peer review of, for 
example, manuscripts for publication, usually, though not 
always, makes the reviewers blind to authorship. More often 
than not, peer reviewers do not know whose manuscripts they 
are reading so that they are not potentially biased by the 
authors’ credentials or experience. Moreover, peer review in the 
context of research assessments permits a kind of semi-public 
scrutiny and dialogue regarding the merits of the researchers’ 
methodology and approaches, precisely because it typically 
involves scrutiny by other experts from outside the original 
author’s workplace or close circle of collaborators. Having your 
immediate colleagues take a look at an article is not what 
journals—or Daubert—means by peer review. Moreover, peer 
review usually also requires written commentary and reasoned 
explanation.107  
The verification phase of fingerprint evidence thus fails 
to map precisely onto scientific peer review in several 
important ways. To be sure, if verification were conducted as a 
“blind” review, i.e., the verifying examiner did not know whose 
identification she was verifying or even that she was 
conducting a verification rather than an initial analysis, it 
  
 105 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
 106 Id. 
 107 On peer review, see generally Effie J. Chan, The ‘Brave New World’ of 
Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 NYU L. 
REV. 100 (1995); Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism:” Expert Peer Review and The 
Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033 (2000); Susan Haack, Peer 
Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 819 (2007).  
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would be a closer, though still not exact, fit. But even blind 
peer review would be more of a check on consistency—
reliability in the scientific, rather than legal sense—rather 
than validity or accuracy. That two examiners reached the 
same conclusion shows no more and no less than that they 
reached the same conclusion. If blind verifiers consistently 
reach the same conclusion as the original analyst, it shows that 
the method generates consistent results, but it does not 
necessarily show that it achieves accurate results, though in 
some instances we may be willing to infer accuracy from 
consistency.108  
Clearly, then, verification cannot simply be equated 
with academic peer review. However, I grant that equating 
verification with peer review is not quite as distressing, 
conceptually, as equating adversarial testing with scientific 
testing, especially given that Daubert intended its criteria as 
suggestions rather than hard requirements. These suggestions 
may be appropriately modified to apply to the particular 
circumstances of the practices at issue and the “task at hand” 
in the specific case109 and thus a loose analogy between peer 
  
 108 Accuracy and consistency are not necessarily correlated—I could have a 
miscalibrated instrument that gives me the same result every time and yet is always 
wrong. It is equally possible that there could be a method that generates consistent 
results even when practiced by different individuals, but these consistent results were 
not accurate. Think for example, of a poorly designed psychological test for depression. 
Different testgivers might use the test on patients, get consistent diagnoses, and yet be 
wrong, because the test wasn’t well designed in the first place. Ironically, in the case of 
latent fingerprint identification, the absence of a consistent method (given that, as 
discussed above, at infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, ACE-V is less a method 
than an outline of procedural steps for careful looking) might legitimate an inference of 
some degree of validity from generally consistent results through blind peer review. If 
examiners have extremely consistent results notwithstanding the fact that they use an 
array of imprecisely defined and not-quite-identical approaches, including choosing 
different minutiae, different standards for determining the quantum of information 
required to call an identification, and varied practices for conducting a comparison, we 
might be prepared to think their consistent results provided some warrant for inferring 
validity. It is as if instead of conducting the same psychological test multiple times, we 
conducted several different psychological tests and all of them resulted in the same 
diagnosis; these multiple methods’ consistent results would be cumulative, and thus 
could increase our confidence in the correctness of the original diagnosis. The irony is 
that this potential evidentiary power of verification results from the lack of formalized 
or consistent standards; to whatever extent examiners are doing the same thing as one 
another, verification can establish only consistency, or a check on methodological error, 
but not validity, because the verification evidence would be merely redundant, rather 
than cumulative. On cumulative and redundant evidence, see generally DAVID A. 
SCHUM, THE EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (2001). For an 
analogous argument in the context of human/technology partnerships in fingerprint 
evidence, see Dror & Mnookin, supra note 17, at 60-65.  
 109 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137, the third case in the so-called Daubert trilogy, 
emphasizes the importance of focusing on the “task at hand.” For discussion of the 
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review and verification might not be out of place. But given 
that there is absolutely no publicly-available data about how 
often peer review of the sort engaged in by fingerprint 
examiners actually catches errors, or how well it functions in 
operation, the courts’ easy willingness to presume its utility 
seems to be overreaching. For example, if non-blind verifiers 
virtually never disagree with the original analyst, than the 
power of this “review” as a check may in fact be quite limited, 
for it might be that whatever errors do occur are, as in the 
Mayfield case, likely to be repeated by subsequent analysts as 
well. 110  
But while the analysis in Havvard is generally 
unpersuasive, it is the opinion’s conclusion that is most ostrich-
like of all. The court wrote, “In sum, despite the absence of a 
single quantifiable standard for measuring the sufficiency of 
any latent print for purposes of identification, the court is 
satisfied that latent print identification easily satisfies the 
standards of reliability in Daubert and Kumho Tire. In fact, 
after going through this analysis, the court believes that latent 
print identification is the very archetype of reliable expert 
testimony under those standards.”111 Reasonable people can 
disagree about whether fingerprint evidence ought to be 
admissible under Daubert. But to argue that it is the “very 
archetype of reliable expert testimony under those standards”112 
strains all credibility. Only by putting one’s head in the sand 
could one possibly conclude that latent fingerprint evidence—
which has been tested in the adversarial crucible but not 
scientifically, lacks meaningful error rate information, and 
operates without statistical foundation or any validated, 
objective criteria for determining a match—is the archetype of 
reliable evidence under Daubert.113 
  
importance of this focus, see generally Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”, supra 
note 99. 
 110 However, if verifiers disagree with the original analyst more than 
occasionally, that provides indirect evidence that the error rate for an individual 
examination is not, in fact, negligible.  
 111 Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (emphasis added).  
 112 Id. 
 113 Another ostrich maneuver, in some ways even more extreme than the 
superficial and poorly-reasoned analysis in Havvard, occurs when courts decide that 
pattern identification evidence is so clearly reliable that they do not even permit the 
defense to hold a preliminary hearing on the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 
2001 WL 515213, *1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001), for one example. Of course, this issue is 
complicated by the question of what the defense actually proffers. For example, if a 
defense attorney asks for a hearing but has done no substantial preparation and fails 
to make a credible argument, a judge would appropriately deny the request. That 
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B. The Judiciary’s Own Version of ACE-V 
The second approach is what I, slightly tongue-in-cheek, 
call the judiciary’s version of ACE-V. In this case, the acronym 
stands for “Admissible—Considering Everything, it’s Valid 
(enough).” This category of cases includes those courts who 
attempt, with at least a modicum of seriousness, to engage 
Daubert and Kumho Tire’s requirements vis-à-vis pattern 
identification testimony, and who recognize that the research 
basis supporting the evidence is not what one would wish it to 
be. Nonetheless, these courts, though squirming a bit and 
acknowledging some of the legitimate concerns regarding the 
research basis for this evidence, find that, on balance, the 
evidence still warrants admission in its traditional form, 
though without fully explaining what justifies this conclusion. 
United States v. Sullivan is an illustrative example of 
this approach.114 The court wrote: 
The court shares the defendant’s skepticism that the ACE-V 
methodology enjoys a 0% error rate, making it effectively a perfect 
art. There is no evidence, however, that the ACE-V methodology as 
performed by the FBI suffers from any significant error rate. The 
FBI examiners have demonstrated impressive accuracy on 
certification-related examinations, and Younce testified that an 
examiner who made a false identification would be finished as an 
examiner due to the difficulty in rehabilitating him or her as a 
witness. While the defendant is correct that the party submitting the 
evidence has the burden of establishing its reliability under Daubert, 
the defendant has failed to submit any evidence to dispute the 
plaintiff’s evidence of a minimal error rate. Consequently, while the 
court rejects the plaintiff’s claim of a 0% error rate, it finds that the 
  
appears to be what occurred, for example, in United States v. Pena, in which the trial 
court reasoned, “the case law is overwhelmingly in favor of admitting fingerprint 
experts under virtually any circumstance.” 586 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “Consequently, the court reasoned, the only way it would 
have considered excluding the testimony or giving a limiting instruction ‘is if there had 
been data, real evidence presented about the limitations of fingerprinting.’” Id. 
“Instead, as the court acknowledged, Pena’s motion to exclude relied on ‘one article 
from the Fordham Law Review, and that’s not enough to carry the weight of the 
exclusion motion.’” Id. It is quite understandable that a court is not going to waste its 
time with a preliminary hearing when the defense is so ill-prepared. But the appellate 
case law in the case suggests that it is never an abuse of discretion to admit fingerprint 
evidence without a preliminary hearing, and this is a distressing—and ostrich-like—
conclusion. Id. Interestingly, just as this Article was going to press, Judge Nancy 
Gertner, whose opinion refusing a Daubert hearing was affirmed in Pena, subsequently 
issued a novel procedural order explicitly referencing the NAS report, to make clear her 
openness to hearing well-prepared challenges to pattern identification evidence. See 
Procedural Order, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/ProcOrder 
TraceEvidenceUPDATE.pdf (last visited April 17, 2010). 
 114 246 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003).  
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error rate is not sufficient to render ACE-V unreliable under 
Daubert.115 
The court squarely recognized that a zero percent error rate is 
not credible. The court further acknowledged that the 
proffering party had the burden of showing reliability, which 
ought to have meant that a lack of error rate information 
counted against the prosecution.116 Nonetheless, in the face of 
this acknowledged absence of information supporting any 
particular error rate, the court found that good performance on 
certification exams and a culture that deems any discovered 
identification errors so impermissible as to be career-ending, 
spoke sufficiently to the question of error rate as to render the 
ACE-V approach to fingerprint identification reliable under 
Daubert. To be sure, in the right circumstances, proficiency 
tests could indeed provide substantial and adequate 
information regarding error rates, but the current certification 
tests are neither challenging enough nor taken in 
circumstances sufficiently mirroring actual practice for this 
inference to be warranted.117 Similarly, the fact that the 
professional culture within the latent fingerprint community 
may view any false identification error as career-jeopardizing if 
discovered does not itself establish that errors do not occur. 
Indeed, one could imagine that a professional culture that 
deems certain errors career-ending might also be a culture that 
chooses not to look very hard for them.  
Turning to the testing factor of Daubert, the judge 
explained: 
The court further finds that, while the ACE-V methodology appears 
to be amenable to testing, such testing has not yet been performed. 
The court disagrees that testing that establishes the validity of the 
principles underlying ACE-V-that fingerprints are unique and 
permanent-can substitute for testing of the ACE-V methodology 
itself. That testing, however, is relevant as it provides a foundation 
for the ACE-V methodology. . . . But as the defendant points out, 
there is not a standard defining how many similarities must be 
found before a match is declared. Younce testified that there is no 
minimum number of “points” in common necessary to declare a 
match between a known and an unknown print. Indeed, Younce 
testified that such a requirement would be unscientific. While it is 
possible that this position is ultimately correct, it is not supported by 
the studies submitted by the plaintiff. Evidence that no two 
  
 115 Id. at 704. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See generally Koehler, Proficiency Tests, supra note 1; Mnookin, 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
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fingerprints are the same—or that no two 21.7% of a print are the 
same—is not evidence that no two fingerprints can share a partial 
print in common. The court finds that this concern does not render 
fingerprint evidence unreliable for the purposes of Daubert. While 
the possibility that two fingers may have a fractional portion of a 
print in common may affect the probability estimates that two 
fingers may leave the same fractional print, that possibility goes to 
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.118 
Note that here, the court determined that testing could be done 
and that it had not yet been done. Furthermore, the court 
understood, quite correctly, that evidence supporting the 
uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints did not itself 
establish that fingerprint examiners could actually make 
certain identifications. The court further recognized the lack of 
objective standards for determining a match. But at this point, 
the court essentially punted. Without any serious effort at 
analysis or explanation, the court simply decided that these 
difficulties went to the weight of the evidence rather than its 
admissibility.119 Still, compared to ostrich judges, this court at 
least elected to name clearly some of the problems with the 
research basis supporting fingerprint identification.  
Another one of the many examples of judicial ACE-V 
thinking is the appellate opinion in United States v. Mitchell.120 
The court acknowledged that if “directed, specific actual 
testing” were the requirement of Daubert, then fingerprint 
evidence would have significant problems.121 However, the court 
seemed to believe that “directed, specific, actual testing” was 
not in fact required; instead, the long and substantial history of 
the use of the technique could provide what the court 
considered to be a form of “implicit testing.”122 Moreover, the 
court emphasized that while it was indeed required to be a 
“gatekeeper” for scientific evidence, it was also “only a 
gatekeeper, and a gatekeeper alone does not protect the 
castle.”123 All in all, though the evidence supporting validity 
might be imperfect, the real question, in the court’s estimation, 
was whether the available evidence of validity was sufficient to 
pass the baton from the court to the adversary system.124 In 
other words, fingerprint evidence might not be Valid (with a 
  
 118 Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
 119 Id. 
 120 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
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capital V) but it was valid enough, in the court’s estimation, for 
cross-examination and counter-expertise to be an adequate 
corrective to whatever limitations might be present.125  
Another, and perhaps the best-known, example of 
judicial ACE-V thinking is Judge Louis Pollak’s second opinion 
in United States v. Llera Plaza (“Llera Plaza II”).126 The first 
time he considered fingerprint evidence, the judge—an 
especially thoughtful jurist, and a former professor and dean at 
Yale Law School—made fingerprint history by ruling, in Llera 
Plaza I, that latent fingerprint evidence did not pass muster 
under Daubert. After a re-hearing on somewhat unusual 
procedural grounds, Judge Pollak, by his own admission, 
changed his mind. In his second opinion, Llera Plaza II, he 
continued to find that Daubert’s testing factor was not fulfilled. 
On error rates, he found that the extant proficiency tests gave 
little assistance because they were too easy to provide a 
  
 125 There is an important point lurking here. The best argument for 
admissibility under Daubert is that the problems with fingerprint evidence are 
problems that can adequately be made clear and explicated to a lay factfinder on cross-
examination. Hence the evidence need not be excluded, because, given that this isn’t 
“rocket science,” as Judge Gertner put it in an important case limiting handwriting 
identification evidence, juries can adequately understand the weaknesses and evaluate 
accordingly. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (1999). Whether or not this 
is a fair assessment of jury capacity, it is far from clear why the adversary system’s 
mechanisms should be deemed adequate for forensic science, but not in other arenas of 
expert evidence. In any event, for this argument to have any merit whatsoever, judges 
do clearly have to give the defense significant leeway in calling expert witnesses who 
can provide these important field critiques. There have been several judges who, 
having decided that the evidence is admissible under the applicable legal standard, 
have then refused to allow the defendant to offer testimony challenging its 
fundamental validity. This is both disturbing and disingenuous—if the best argument 
for admission of pattern identification evidence is that it can be adequately 
“impeached” through the adversary process, then it is imperative that the defense have 
the opportunity to present the weaknesses and uncertainties of the evidence. For 
examples of cases that undertake this sleight of hand, see, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 920 
So. 2d 769 (2006) (excluding Simon Cole’s testimony, reasoning, “what Dr. Cole cannot 
do in challenging the admissibility of the State’s fingerprint evidence, he equally 
cannot do here in purportedly challenging the weight of said evidence”); United States 
v. Taylor, No. CR 07-1244 WJ, 2009 WL 6338569 (D.N.M., Sept. 30, 2009) (firearms 
identification case where the testimony of Adina Schwartz was excluded at trial 
because “to allow Dr. Schwartz to give this testimony during a trial would not be, as 
Defendant argues, to allow a healthy ‘battle of the experts.’ Instead it would be to 
engage in what this Court considers the highly questionable practice of allowing a 
second Daubert hearing to play out in front of the jury.”) Daubert itself says, “Vigorous 
cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). If the best argument for admitting 
this evidence notwithstanding its shakiness is that understanding the weaknesses is 
not beyond the ken of the jury, it is imperative that the defense be permitted the 
“traditional and appropriate means” of attacking this evidence. Id. 
 126 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Penn. 2002).  
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discriminating measure of competence. But he nonetheless 
found that the absence of any evidence showing a substantial 
error rate provided some evidence that the error rate was 
tolerably low.127 His bottom line was, more or less, that 
fingerprint evidence wasn’t exemplary, but it was good enough: 
“[T]o postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock 
forensic identifier’ pending such research would be to make the 
best the enemy of the good.”128 All things considered, it’s valid 
(enough).  
C. Dividing the Baby: The Solomonic Compromise 
The third approach, to which I will give the most 
attention because it represents the most thoughtful judicial 
approach taken to date to assessing the admissibility of 
forensic science evidence in court, is what I am calling the 
“Solomonic compromise.” This approach reflects judges’ efforts 
to split the difference between admissibility and exclusion in a 
way that superficially seems to make sense, but becomes, I will 
suggest, increasingly problematic upon careful reflection. This 
approach permits the expert to testify about similarities and 
differences in the patterns at issue, but prohibits or limits the 
expert from reaching expert conclusions about the meaning of 
those similarities. Llera Plaza I—the opinion Judge Pollak 
vacated after a preliminary hearing—took precisely this 
approach. His explanation in his original opinion is worth 
quoting in detail: 
Since the court finds that ACE-V does not meet Daubert’s 
testing, peer review, and standards criteria, and that information as 
to ACE V’s rate of error is in limbo, the expected conclusion would be 
that the government should be precluded from presenting any 
fingerprint testimony. But that conclusion—apparently putting at 
naught a century of judicial acquiescence in fingerprint identification 
processes—would be unwarrantably heavy-handed. The Daubert 
difficulty with the ACE-V process is by no means total. The difficulty 
comes into play at the stage at which, as experienced fingerprint 
specialists Ashbaugh and Meagher themselves acknowledge, the 
ACE-V process becomes “subjective”—namely, the evaluation stage. 
By contrast, the antecedent analysis and comparison stages are, 
according to the testimony, “objective”: analysis of the rolled and 
latent prints and comparison of what the examiner has observed in 
  
 127 Id. at 566. 
 128 Id. at 572. For a thoughtful critical analysis of this opinion, see generally 
David H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073 (2003). 
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the two prints. Up to the evaluation stage, the ACE-V fingerprint 
examiner’s testimony is descriptive, not judgmental. Accordingly, 
this court will permit the government to present testimony by 
fingerprint examiners who, suitably qualified as “expert” examiners 
by virtue of training and experience, may (1) describe how the rolled 
and latent fingerprints at issue in this case were obtained, (2) 
identify and place before the jury the fingerprints and such 
magnifications thereof as may be required to show minute details, 
and (3) point out observed similarities (and differences) between any 
latent print and any rolled print the government contends are 
attributable to the same person. What such expert witnesses will not 
be permitted to do is to present “evaluation” testimony as to their 
“opinion” (Rule 702) that a particular latent print is in fact the print 
of a particular person. The defendants will be permitted to present 
their own fingerprint experts to counter the government’s fingerprint 
testimony, but defense experts will also be precluded from 
presenting “evaluation” testimony. Government counsel and defense 
counsel will, in closing arguments, be free to argue to the jury that, 
on the basis of the jury’s observation of a particular latent print and 
a particular rolled print, the jury may find the existence, or the non-
existence, of a match between the prints.129 
There are several aspects to note regarding Llera Plaza 
I’s logic. First, the court clearly and decisively recognizes that 
the latent fingerprint identification evidence did not fare well 
under Daubert’s strictures.130 But then, because some part of 
the evidence is “descriptive, not judgmental” and in partial 
deference to the long judicial acceptance of this form of proof, 
the judge determined that outright exclusion would be 
“unwarrantably heavy-handed.”131 His compromise was to 
permit the expert to show the jury the similarities in the prints 
at issue, to point their attention toward the data that the 
expert would typically use to derive his or her conclusion, but 
to prohibit the expert from actually providing that conclusion 
or opinion to the jury. The idea is that the expert would merely 
be showing “objective” data to the jury; it would then be up to 
the jury, without overt expert assistance, to decide what 
  
 129 Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516. Note that while Judge Pollak was 
the first judge to take this compromise approach to the admissibility of latent 
fingerprint evidence in particular, he was following an approach taken by several other 
courts in the context of expert evidence on handwriting identification evidence. The 
first judge to take this approach was Judge Matsch, in the trial of Timothy McVeigh for 
the Oklahoma City bombing. No written opinion was issued, but the transcript of the 
discussion of this issue is available at Pre-Trial Transcr., United States v. McVeigh, 
1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1997). Judge Nancy Gertner was the first judge to 
issue a written opinion in support of this approach in United States v. Hines, 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999). See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text. 
 130 Llera Plaza (I), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.  
 131 Id.  
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meaning to give to the data, and what conclusion, if any, to 
reach about the likelihood that the fingerprints it had been 
shown derived from a common source.  
While other courts have not yet taken this approach to 
fingerprint evidence (and of course Pollak himself reversed 
course in Llera Plaza II), a number of other judges have 
adopted this same structural compromise—description without 
ultimate conclusion—in cases involving other kinds of pattern 
identification evidence, notably handwriting and firearms 
identification.132  
At first glance, this compromise approach seems to be a 
clever and appropriate strategy.133 Merely pointing out the 
similarities and differences in two visible patterns without 
providing any conclusion does, it seems to me, reduce or even 
eliminate the Daubert problems with the evidence. To be sure, 
it is not altogether clear that an expert’s testimony is even 
necessary to point out similarities and differences in two visual 
exemplars, as the jury members can look at the images for 
themselves and thus have access to the same visual data with 
or without the expert’s testimony. However, due to his or her 
training and experience, an expert may well be better at seeing 
those similarities and differences. Lay jurors may therefore be 
meaningfully assisted in their own observations and 
examinations of the visual stimuli by having the expert point 
out precisely what is worth looking at, how to look, and how to 
see minutiae, and both the similarities and differences in the 
visual exemplars, for themselves.  
The experts, in other words, may, under this approach, 
provide the factfinder with a kind of educative expertise—the 
expert does not ask for deference to his or her authority, but 
rather, teaches the jury members how to see the patterns 
present in the fingerprint or bullet or handwriting sample for 
  
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(involving handwriting identification); United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. 
Mass. 2005) (involving firearms identification); United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 
567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (permitting a firearms identification to be deemed “more likely 
than not” but not permitting individualization in absolute terms). There are several 
other handwriting identification cases that have followed Hines in taking this 
approach. See generally Risinger, Cases Involving, supra note 8. 
 133 Indeed, several academic commentators have noted it with approval. See, 
e.g., Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Misled, While Still 
Admitting Weakly Supported Forensic Science into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609 
(2007); Robert P. Mosteller, Finding the Golden Mean with Daubert: An Elusive, 
Perhaps Impossible, Goal, 52 VILL. L. REV. 723, 760-62 (2007). 
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themselves.134 It is as if the expert is teaching the jury how to 
read music, instead of playing the notes on the piano himself. 
The expert provides a lesson in “how to see,” and the jury then 
exercises its own vision and reaches its own conclusion. 
Framed in this way, it is fair to say that the expert assistance 
in pointing out similarities and any difference meets the 
“helpfulness” requirement for expert testimony under 
Daubert.135  
Furthermore, the lack of knowledge about error rates, 
the non-existence of objective standards for determining a 
match, and the lack of statistical models for determining the 
probabilities of a match do not seem nearly as problematic 
under Daubert, at least at first glance, when no conclusion 
about the meaning of the match is being provided. As Judge 
Gertner explained in a case involving handwriting 
identification, 
[The expert’s] account of what is similar or not similar in the 
handwriting of [the defendant] and the robber can be understood and 
evaluated by the jury. . . . This is not rocket science, or higher math. 
Her conclusion of authorship, however, has a difference resonance: 
“Out of all of my experience, and training, I am saying that he is the 
one, the very author.” That leap may not at all be justified by the 
underlying data; and in the context of this case, is extraordinarily 
prejudicial.136 
If the expert confines herself to pointing out similarities and 
differences to the factfinder, while eschewing all conclusions, 
then the questions regarding the legitimate strength of the 
expert’s conclusions, or the lack of a statistical model to justify 
a claim about the probabilities associated with a match, or the 
appropriate error rates associated with the expert’s 
conclusions, all become moot. No match, and, indeed, no 
ultimate conclusion regarding identification or its absence, is 
being introduced into evidence.  
Perhaps, then, this compromise provides an exemplary 
way to navigate away from the awkward spot in which the 
forensic sciences now find themselves? Certainly, the small 
handful of judges that have put forward this compromise view 
are to be commended, for they are wrestling valiantly with a 
  
 134 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: 
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). For an extensive discussion of 
education versus deference in the context of handwriting identification experts, see 
generally Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 1.  
 135 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 591. 
 136 Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
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set of hard questions about how to handle these powerful but 
inadequately tested forms of proof. It may well be that the 
Solomonic compromise is the best practical alternative we can 
come up with at present if courts deem exclusion too draconian 
a remedy. This compromise eliminates the excessively strong 
and presently unjustified claims about the strength of forensic 
experts’ conclusions. It represents an effort to acknowledge, on 
the one hand, the likely power of this evidence, while, on the 
other hand, not treating the evidence as if it passes Daubert 
with flying colors like Havvard.  
And yet, just like King Solomon’s proposal to divide the 
baby between the two women claiming to be its mother, this 
compromise approach is, unfortunately, fundamentally 
unsatisfying. Why so? Upon careful analysis, there are two 
significant difficulties that arise. First, it may be substantially 
more difficult, as a practical matter, to eliminate the evaluative 
aspects from testimony than one might expect. For example, 
Judge Gertner wrote in Hines, “The witness can be cross 
examined, as she was, about why this difference was not 
considered consequential, while this difference was, and the 
jury can draw their own conclusions.”137 But notice what the 
witness would be testifying to here. While she would not be 
testifying to an ultimate conclusion about authorship, she 
would be testifying as to why some differences are considered 
consequential and others are not, rather than simply 
presenting the visual content of the handwriting exemplars 
and pointing out similarities and/or differences. This is, 
already, evaluative rather than merely descriptive.138 She would 
be saying, more or less, “this kind of difference is still 
consistent with the two samples coming from the same person’s 
writing, while this other difference is not something we would 
expect to see in two samples of writing from the same person.” 
Perhaps the expert’s inferences regarding the interpretive 
  
 137 Id. 
 138 Moreover, as I pointed out some time ago, taken to the extreme, this would 
result in little more than a semantic difference between this “restricted” approach and 
permitting conclusion testimony under Daubert. If an expert can say to the jury, “Look 
at these seventeen meaningful similarities, and here’s why they are really meaningful” 
and, “Look at these three apparent differences, and here’s why I don’t think they count 
for anything,” the expert’s own conclusion about authorship or identification would be 
completely clear to the jury, even if the expert did not actually use the words “match” 
anywhere in his or her testimony. See generally Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra 
note 1; accord, Risinger, Cases Involving, supra note 8, at 510; D. Michael Risinger & 
Jeffrey Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender 
Profiling”, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193, 209-10 (2002). 
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meaning of this data are correct, and perhaps not. The point is 
that either way, this is not merely showing the jury the 
existence of similarities and differences but is, already, 
evaluating their meaning, determining which differences truly 
“count” in favor of a conclusion of authorship and which may 
not. And thus we need again to ask a set of already familiar 
questions: What data shows that the expert can do what she or 
he claims to be able to do? Is there data to support the notion 
that a certain kind of difference is consistent with authorship 
and another kind is not? How accurate are such conclusions? 
What is their error rate?  
We have returned, in essence, straight back to the 
Daubert problem, albeit having drilled down the analysis to a 
more particularized, local, level, rather than asking validity 
questions with respect to an overall conclusion about 
authorship of the writing. Similarly, in the case of fingerprint 
identification, consider the expert’s belief that a particular 
apparent visual difference between the two prints is an artifact 
rather than an actual discrepancy. If the expert is permitted to 
testify that he or she believes that a particular difference is not 
a true discrepancy, that too raises all the same questions about 
the extent to which data supports the ability of an expert to 
accurately distinguish between source discrepancies and 
differences that are not interpretively meaningful, “real” 
differences in the source prints versus those differences that 
derive from the process of taking and making the images. At 
present, adequate published data regarding the reliability and 
scientific validity of these mid-level inferences is largely non-
existent.  
This analysis might suggest a straightforward answer: 
perhaps what is needed is simply to take a more complete end-
run around Daubert by carefully prohibiting what we might 
call “intermediate” inferences about the evidence. Judges could 
permit experts truly to testify only to what they see, literally 
just to point the factfinder toward details on the bullet, the 
print, or the handwriting exemplar that the layperson might 
not have noticed without expert assistance. If experts truly 
limited themselves only to description,139 wouldn’t that 
  
 139 I am here ignoring the question of whether there is actually any such thing 
as description without interpretation—my own view would be that there is not. 
Nonetheless, these are matters of degree, and prohibiting all inferences about the 
likely significance of the minutiae observed does get closer to being “just” description 
than does permitting the expert’s overtly evaluative statements. 
1258 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
eliminate the lurking validity problems associated with mid-
level evaluations and conclusions? Leave it entirely to the jury 
to decide whether particular visual differences ought or ought 
not to be taken as meaningful discrepancies in two 
fingerprints. Leave it to the jury to decide whether the quantity 
and types of differences in two handwriting samples suggest 
distinct authorship or remain consistent with one person 
having some degree of inevitable variation in how they form 
their letters. 
If we truly limited the expert to “pure” description, this 
might indeed solve the lurking Daubert issues, though it would 
do so by radically curtailing the expert’s role. It should be noted 
that this would also be quite an unusual approach to 
expertise—part of what is special about experts’ roles under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is precisely that experts are 
typically given significantly more leeway than lay witnesses to 
provide their opinions and conclusions.140 Placing forensic 
experts into a kind of Lockean straitjacket—permitting them 
only to testify to what they can empirically observe, rather 
than allowing them to share the inferences and judgments they 
make about what they see—is, in a sense, to de-authorize them 
as experts. Much of what a forensic expert thinks of as his or 
her expertise—which is precisely the experience-based ability 
to assess and analyze the image; to differentiate signal from 
noise and artifact from discrepancy; and to evaluate whether 
two patterns did or did not come from the same source—would 
no longer be permitted. This is not necessarily a bad outcome—
indeed, it might well spur an increased interest among forensic 
scientists themselves in promoting and participating in the 
research that would permit the courts to grant them a more 
significant evaluative role. But it is important to recognize that 
if we take this compromise seriously, the permitted testimony 
must be quite limited, significantly more curtailed than it was, 
for example, in Hines itself.141  
Moreover, we should recognize that juries will likely 
still find such extremely curtailed evidence quite probative. 
Juries walk in the door with prior, culturally-based views about 
evidence and what kinds of evidence count, and most jurors 
probably arrive with a deeply-held belief in the significant 
power of pattern identification evidence, just like my seatmate 
  
 140 See generally FED. R. EVID. 701-02.  
 141 Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62. 
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on the airplane whose beliefs about forensic science derived 
mostly from her television-viewing. So even if all an expert did 
was point out similarities, with absolutely no testimony 
whatsoever about the meaning of these similarities, a jury 
might be quite prepared to presume that those similarities 
imply that the two impressions come from a common source.  
This leads to the second, more serious difficulty. The 
still-larger problem with the Solomonic compromise is that if 
experts cannot provide some data-based, research-justified 
evidence supporting their conclusions, it is not clear that the 
impression evidence should be admissible at all. The problem, 
in a sense, migrates: it stops being a problem relating to the 
adequacy of the evidence supporting scientific validity, and 
becomes a problem of relevance and probative value.  
To put the point in terms of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, radically curtailing the experts’ testimony solves the 
Rule 702 expert evidence problem, but at the cost of creating a 
Rule 401/403 problem. Rule 401 requires that all evidence be 
relevant, and the Federal Rules define as relevant that 
evidence which makes “the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”142 Rule 
403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence when “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.”143 
The problem, in a nutshell, is that if the expert cannot 
provide the factfinder with any admissible evidence about the 
meaning of the visual similarities and differences, then the 
factfinder has no rational basis for assessing the probative 
value of these observations. Certainly the factfinder can look at 
the visual stimuli herself, but what legitimate basis does she 
have for making an inference about probative value given 
whatever quantum of similarities she observes? The key 
question about the meaning of any pattern identification 
evidence is how much support it provides for the inference that 
two patterns do or do not share a common source. How often 
would we expect to see any given degree of similarity from two 
bullets that did not come from the same gun, or from two 
  
 142 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 143 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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fingerprints that were not actually impressions from the same 
finger?  
To answer this question, juries could draw on two 
potential sources of knowledge: information provided by the 
evidence presented to them at trial via an expert, or their own 
experience. But in the Solomonic compromise, we are 
prohibiting the first kind of information, because it does not at 
present meet Daubert’s strictures. So juries are left entirely to 
their own resources and devices—only their own experience 
can help them assess the probative value of the patterns at 
issue. But a serious problem arises because—with the possible 
exception of handwriting identification—juries simply do not 
have any meaningful experience on which to draw for these 
conclusions. Non-experts are not in the habit of looking closely 
at ridge minutiae on fingerprints to develop intuitions about 
how much similarity might exist on the tips of two different 
individuals’ fingers. Ordinary people do not encounter bullet 
striations in their regular life. Jurors therefore have literally 
no personal, experience-based information that would provide 
any rational basis for evaluating the similarities and 
differences that the expert helped them to notice. While the 
evidence might nonetheless squeak by Rule 401, given the very 
low threshold for defining relevance under the Rules of 
Evidence, the lack of any rational basis for assessing its 
meaning makes the evidence both prejudicial and potentially 
misleading, thus rendering it excludable under Rule 403.144 One 
can think of the issue like this: because we believe forensic 
expert testimony often has probative value, it is therefore 
relevant—but because we really do not have any rational way 
to assess that probative value, its admissibility seriously risks 
being both misleading and prejudicial.  
To be sure, we regularly permit jurors to engage in lay 
assessments of “frequencies” and to determine for themselves 
probative value in the trial process. If a victim who saw the 
perpetrator testifies that the person who assaulted her had 
grey hair, a beard, and a tattoo of a purple parrot on his 
forearm, and the defendant also has those characteristics, we 
  
 144 Certainly it is a reasonable inference to say that two prints or two bullets 
that have many similarities to one another are more likely to come from a common 
source than two that do not. For this reason, the evidence does, I suppose, meet 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401’s low standard, which deems relevant that evidence 
which has “any tendency” to make a matter more or less probative standard. The 
problem that we know it has some tendency, but cannot presently quantify how much 
or how little power it really has.  
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do not require any data to be presented to the jury on the 
frequency with which any or all of these characteristics 
actually exist within the relevant suspect population. Nor do 
we require any formalized model for assessing the likelihood 
that these traits would co-exist within a given individual 
within that population, or whether the different characteristics 
tend to be statistically independent from one another or not. 145 
We let the jury decide for itself precisely how much power and 
how much probative value to give to the evidence introduced 
that shows that the perpetrator and the defendants share 
certain characteristics in common. The fact that individual 
juror’s subjective assessments of the frequency of purple parrot 
tattoos might be wildly off-base does not render the evidence 
inadmissible. 
Why, then, is the evidence of the similarities in bullet 
striations or ridge detail on fingerprints any different from the 
evidence of the purple parrot tattoo? Yes, juror assessments of 
the evidentiary power of the pattern similarities in a 
fingerprint might be substantially inaccurate, but that risk 
exists in the tattoo scenario as well. The difference, I would 
suggest, is that we believe that jurors’ ordinary lives provide 
them with some legitimate basis—albeit partial and 
imperfect—for assessing the frequency of purple parrot tattoos 
on people’s forearms. In ordinary life, people see each other’s 
forearms—and each other’s tattoos—with some regularity. 
Most of us probably do not go around counting how many 
people have tattoos, or keeping track of how many birds we 
have ever seen tattooed on other people’s bodies. But 
nonetheless, our individual paths navigating through the 
crowded world do give us an experiential basis for having a 
rough empirical sense of just how rare or common purple 
parrot tattoos might be.146 Note, in a sense, that our individual 
  
 145 Indeed, in the famous case of People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), a 
case that came to stand for the reluctance of courts to frame questions in overtly 
probabilistic terms, the effort to use the “product” rule to figure out a combined 
probability of a variety of specific characteristics—ranging from the fact that the couple 
was interracial to the fact that she had blonde hair and a ponytail and he had a 
beard—was strongly criticized. For the classic critique of excessive confidence in 
probabilistic thinking in court, see generally Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). However, one 
of the (numerous) problems in Collins was that the numbers presented to the jurors 
were purely speculative—they were simply the expert’s illustration of possible numbers 
to illustrate how the product rule worked, rather than numbers based on empirical 
reality. Collins, 438 P.2d 33. 
 146 There is a stronger argument for taking the “compromise” approach in 
handwriting identification cases, precisely because our ordinary lives do give us some 
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relationships to the evaluation of parrot tattoos are rather like 
the forensic expert’s relationship to the evaluation of 
patterns—they are experience-based, non-quantitative, and 
without any known error rate. The difference however, is in 
role: we expect juries to bring their common knowledge to their 
role as factfinder and to their assessment of the evidence, and 
we do not require this common knowledge to be validated or 
scientific. The same cannot be said for the expert required to 
meet the strictures of Daubert. 
In addition, the strong cultural belief in forensic science 
evidence, based first and foremost on its roughly one hundred 
years of courtroom use, likely means that even without any 
actual experience of their own looking at comparable patterns, 
jurors will believe they do know the meaning of the similarities 
they are taught by the expert to observe. With latent 
fingerprint examination, the tradition of experts 
individualizing in court—without adequate data or research to 
support their claim—may well mean that when a jury is 
presented with latent fingerprint identification evidence 
without any expert conclusions, it will nonetheless believe itself 
quite capable of drawing a conclusion of identity. But this 
confidence and belief does not derive from the first-hand 
experience of jury members looking with care at fingerprints or 
bullet striations. Rather, it would stem from their prior belief 
that latent fingerprints can individualize, and hence if these 
prints appear reasonably similar, then they probably did come 
from the same person. They may not ever have looked at 
fingerprints for themselves, but from courtroom dramas on 
television, from criminal cases they have read about in the 
newspaper, from CSI, from their myriad cultural experiences in 
the world, they may well believe not only that everyone’s 
fingerprints are different, but also that two similar prints must 
necessarily have come from the same finger.147 
  
meaningful experience looking at people’s handwriting. Non-experts do have some 
experience looking at writing, attempting to gauge authorship, and have an experience-
based sense of what degree of similarity of writing one might expect to see in the 
writing of the same author versus two different authors. To be sure, experts may be 
better than non-experts at assessing the meaning of these similarities and 
differences—but the point here is not who is better at this, or by what degree, but 
rather, whether non-experts have a lay basis for evaluation sufficient to justify 
admissibility of the similarities if there is no admissible evidence about their meaning. 
To put it differently, handwriting is a lot more like the purple parrot tattoo. 
 147 The cultural mythology of fingerprints remains deep and widespread; even 
my seven-year-old son told me the other day that everyone’s fingerprints are different. 
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Notice the concerning kind of feedback loop occurring 
here. The substance of the excluded evidence—conclusions 
about the common source of the latent print and the 
exemplar—is likely to be presumed by the jury precisely 
because that now-excluded evidence has generally been 
admitted in the past. If my hunch about likely jury 
expectations and prior understanding is correct, then the 
common knowledge that will be doing a good deal of 
interpretive work for the jury when they try to assess the 
fingerprint is the very evidence that was excluded. That 
certainly raises a significant Rule 403 problem.  
Therefore, unless the expert can provide the jury with 
some valuable, data-driven basis for interpreting the meaning 
of the similarities and differences that are presented, the 
pattern identification evidence presented under the Solomonic 
compromise still ought to raise significant admissibility 
concerns. This is not because the experts’ descriptions are 
insufficiently reliable under Rule 702, but because of the lack 
of any basis—apart from the jury’s likely prior belief in the 
very conclusions that have been excluded—for meaningfully 
evaluating the probative value of the evidence.  
The Solomonic compromise is thus far more problematic 
than it initially appears. However, I recognize that it might 
nonetheless be a reasonable second-best solution given the 
present impasse, and I therefore do believe it has a legitimate 
place in the judicial “toolkit” for assessing pattern 
identification evidence. Moreover, there might be ways, at trial, 
to dislodge, at least partially, whatever prior beliefs the jurors 
had about the basis for individualization or the meaning of a 
“match.” If the Solomonic compromise were coupled with 
effective evidence to demonstrate that there is not a statistical 
basis for reaching a conclusion about whether the two patterns 
come from a common source, nor any validated metrics for 
evaluating how much similarity is needed to warrant such a 
conclusion, the jury might call into question its prior 
assumption that similarity necessarily meant identity. 
There is little doubt that evidence of similarity of bullet 
striation patterns or handwriting similarities or friction-ridge 
patterns on fingerprints often does have probative value. The 
question is how much. The hard question facing judges is what 
to do given that the answer to that “how much” question is, “we 
really don’t quite know.” It seems clear that on the basis of 
current empirical knowledge, judges should absolutely not 
permit conclusions of individualization to be made by experts, 
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and softening an individualization conclusion by framing it as 
“opinion” rather than “fact” does not enhance either its validity 
or its research basis. Nor should either judges or experts kid 
themselves that adding in some fudge words like “to a 
reasonable certainty” changes the analysis at all.148  
The harder question is whether the fact that we don’t 
know precisely how much probative value to assign to evidence 
of any given quantum of similarity—and that a jury assessing 
the meaning of these similarities likely has no first-hand life 
experience to help assess probative value—ought to lead to the 
evidence’s exclusion. As a matter of logic, without some 
meaningful basis for assessing the probative value, the 
evidence becomes literally uninterpretable—and this should 
rationally argue in favor of exclusion. But given that experts’ 
experience and our collective cultural experience over the last 
century with fingerprint identification evidence supports the 
inference that the probative value of this evidence is likely to 
be quite substantial, the Solomonic compromise, 
notwithstanding its awkwardness, might be as good an option 
as any for the moment. The Solomonic compromise, is in a 
sense, an approach based on a bet that the cultural belief in 
forensic science will, when more research has been conducted, 
largely prove to have been warranted. The more confident a 
judge is that future research will be likely to validate the 
claims fingerprint examiners have been making in court for the 
last 100 years, the less troubled she might be by letting those 
conclusions in through the back door, via jurors’ prior beliefs 
about forensic science and its credibility. Put like that, the 
Solomonic compromise becomes a more nuanced version of 
judicial ACE-V—all things considered, it’s valid enough to 
permit, so long as we force it into an uncomfortable 
straitjacket, a straitjacket that cannot be expected to stay on 
within the jury room.  
Thus, even though it does have an appropriate role in 
the judicial toolkit, the Solomonic compromise is, at best, an 
awkward doctrinal solution. If only we had the data to support 
them, it would be far better to permit expert inferences about 
the meaning of similarities and conclusions about probative 
value. It is also worth noting that outright exclusion would put 
significantly more pressure on the forensic science community 
to cooperate with and to lobby for the research that would 
  
 148 Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. 
2010] THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 1265 
bring them back into the evidentiary fold. Nonetheless, I can 
certainly understand the attraction of the Solomonic 
compromise as a second-best solution for probative but under-
researched evidence that has a long history of legal acceptance.  
IV. IN DEFENSE OF EXCLUSION (FOR NOW) 
The other viable alternative is, obviously, outright 
exclusion, at least in some circumstances.149 Given judges’ 
treatment of forensic science evidence so far, arguing for 
exclusion of this evidence can feel, from a practical standpoint, 
more than a little quixotic.  
And yet, the truth of the matter is that at present, 
pattern identification evidence does not have the empirical 
data to back up the claims made in court. Moreover, just as 
with DNA evidence—which after an initial honeymoon period, 
was excluded by a number of jurisdictions for a short period of 
time because of concerns about the subjectivity of standards for 
determining a match; insufficient research into the underlying 
questions of population genetics; and general technical 
sloppiness150—exclusion would be a great motivator for 
pursuing the research necessary to justify admissibility.  
Moreover, I want to suggest that the use of the 
exclusion option —which I do think should have a central place 
in the judicial toolkit, given the present lack of an adequate 
research basis supporting validity—could also be quite short-
term in most pattern identification arenas. For as I will 
suggest, what ought to be the minimum necessary information 
to establish adequate validity under Daubert is simply not that 
onerous. Good proficiency tests, which show the extent to which 
examiners make errors in a variety of different levels of 
difficulty, should suffice to support a finding of adequate 
  
 149 I do not explicitly address the question of when courts should exclude, and 
when the Solomonic approach is warranted. Partly that is because I think, in many 
instances, either approach could be a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion given the 
current state of our knowledge. Moreover, the choice ought to be informed by the 
particulars—were I a judge ruling on admissibility, I would be far more likely to 
exclude a single AFIS-generated match than evidence that linked multiple, high-
quality prints to several different fingers of the same individual. Even without formal 
metrics for sufficiency, common sense—and Kumho Tire—tell us that all identification 
tasks are not created equal, and the judicial response can, and sometimes should, vary 
as a result. 
 150 See generally JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND 
CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING (2007); DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE 
HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2009); Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro, in 
EVIDENCE STORIES (Richard Lempert, ed. 2006). 
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validity, presuming that the error rates discovered through this 
testing process are tolerably low, and the match between what 
was tested and the “task at hand” in the particular case is 
sufficiently close.  
More generally, as I have also argued elsewhere, I want 
to suggest that under Daubert it is the ‘testing’ criteria that 
should matter most.151 I want to make a distinction between 
explanation or description, on the one hand, and testing on the 
other. Explanation of the methods and descriptions of the 
processes used by an expert should not be permitted to 
substitute for adequate testing of validity. It is this mistake, I 
believe, that has often plagued the courts when evaluating 
forensic science. Judges hear about the ACE-V process and 
they listen to examiners describing their approach, and judges 
are persuaded, it seems, that this methodology therefore 
works.152 They, like the factfinders, see the similarities 
magnified and put up on a giant chart, and they “see” the 
method in action, and believe its power. Even putting aside 
that ACE-V is not, in fact, much of a specified methodology, the 
more important point is that the courts should care less about 
the details of the method at issue or its seeming plausibility, 
and more about what evidence there is to support the 
conclusion that the methods actually work.  
In other words, judges have been lulled by plausible 
descriptions and seemingly persuasive explanations of forensic 
science techniques into dismissing the importance of the nearly 
complete lack of empirical support for the experts’ claims. All of 
the opinions discussed above as examples of legal “ACE-V” 
have this quality. These judges recognized the lack of testing, 
but found enough within the description of the method that 
seemed credible that they decided that the technique passed 
muster.153 This, in my view, is a mistake.  
To be sure, the pattern identification techniques of 
forensic science do have a certain intuitive plausibility to them, 
and their early acceptance was linked, in no small part, to this 
cultural plausibility.154 We all have some experience identifying 
handwriting for example: no doubt most of us believe that we 
  
 151 See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and 
Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008) [hereinafter 
Mnookin, Of Black Boxes]. 
 152 See supra Part III.B. 
 153 See generally supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text. 
 154 See generally Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 1; Mnookin, 
Scripting Expertise, supra note 1.  
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could likely distinguish our mother’s handwriting from that of 
our closest friend. We can stare down at our fingerprints as 
well, and can even see for ourselves how the ridges and whorls 
on our fingers vary from those of others. Moreover, these 
patterns have a particular quality—they are semi-legible in 
that they can be seen and their differences can be noted by all 
of us, not just by experts, while at the same time, they still do 
require significant expert analysis and interpretation.  
But the inherent plausibility and the semi-legible 
quality of these materials combine to make it particularly easy 
for judges to be seduced by description and explanation into 
failing to ask what they ought to be asking both as a matter of 
doctrine and as a matter of logic. Their focus should be on the 
degree of empirical support for the actual, specific claims being 
made. They should be asking precisely what evidence supports 
this particular evidentiary claim. With latent fingerprint 
evidence, for example, the most central question ought to be: 
how accurate are examiners when matching latent prints to a 
particular source; latent prints which are often partial, 
frequently smudged, and perhaps even distorted? For any of 
the forensic sciences, what judges ought to ask under Daubert 
is precisely this: what empirical support shows that the expert 
can actually do what she claims to do? What data, what 
testing, would be necessary to justify the claims being made in 
the expert’s testimony?  
An important corollary of this focus on testing is that it 
ought to be permissible under Daubert for the technique or 
method to be a kind of “black box.”155 A “black box” is a 
technique or method that we do not necessarily understand, 
but that we can nonetheless test to see what it does and how it 
works. If there is sufficient testing to show us that it works, I 
do not believe that the proffering party should be required 
under Daubert to show how it works. My argument is that it is 
far less important to pry open this black box than it is to ask 
whether the technique has been tested under conditions 
similar to those at issue in court. Peering inside the black box 
to see how it works is less critical for an assessment of validity 
than assessing whether input/output testing shows that it 
works.156 Indeed, peering inside, on its own, ought to be deemed 
neither necessary, nor sufficient under Daubert.  
  
 155 Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, supra note 151. 
 156 Id. On black box testing, see Risinger, A Glass Nine-Tenths Full, supra 
note 72, at 31 n.66 and Risinger & Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts, supra 
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To make the point more concretely, when it comes to 
fingerprint evidence, for example, what we really need in order 
to justify admissibility is, at a minimum, some very good 
proficiency tests to show us what experts can do and to gain 
information about how often they make mistakes. These 
proficiency tests ought to be appropriately difficult and should 
mirror the range of difficulty found in actual casework. In 
addition, and critically, they should include some of what 
fingerprint experts would call “tough idents”—prints that are 
particularly difficult to identify.157 These proficiency tests 
should ideally be part of the normal stream of casework, so the 
examiner doesn’t know she is being tested and therefore 
possibly perform her analysis with a greater degree of care 
than usual. 158 
Recall that one of the research lacunae with respect to 
fingerprint evidence is that we do not yet have an operational 
statistical model of fingerprints, a model that could provide us 
with empirically grounded information about the likelihood 
that two prints selected at random would both have a specified 
set of minutiae. Recall also that ACE-V is extremely vague, and 
does not come close to providing a fully developed and 
adequately articulated method with detailed specifications.159 
Recall, in addition, that interpretation of fingerprints is 
subjective, without shared norms or rules about what is 
required. My argument is that these gaps in our knowledge 
base, though unfortunate, are not fatal. More precisely, I want 
to suggest that neither a detailed specification of method, nor 
statistical validation of frequencies ought to be seen as 
necessary criteria for using fingerprints as evidence in court 
under Daubert’s strictures.  
In other words, it ought to be acceptable for latent print 
examiners themselves to operate as a kind of black box—for the 
  
note 1, at 40-43. To be sure, I am largely skating around hard questions about whether 
testing can ever be wholly “black box,” or what some degree of internal understanding 
of the method is necessary in order to design good black box tests, and if so, how much. 
Still, the key point is to urge courts to focus not on asking experts to explain what they 
do, but rather to show that what they do works.  
 157 There is not presently any validated metric of difficulty for fingerprint 
comparisons. Nonetheless, examiners do have at least informal understandings of what 
makes particular comparisons more or less difficult.  
 158 There is presently a “black box” study of more or less this sort underway, 
being conducted by Austin Hickland through the FBI. It sounds, from the descriptions, 
like an extremely promising project. However, at this point neither the research 
protocol nor the results have been made public.  
 159 Haber & Haber, supra note 1. 
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examiners themselves to be the instrument, the technique. If 
we know through proficiency tests that they get the right 
answers a very high proportion of the time over a range of 
circumstances that mimic what they encounter in actual cases, 
their testimony ought to be admissible under Daubert. Even if 
we do not fully know how their method operates—indeed, even 
if they do not fully understand it themselves—this ought not to 
prevent us from making evidentiary use of their conclusions if 
we have sufficient information about how accurate they are 
and what circumstances and conditions seem to increase the 
risk of error. 
Let me make one thing clear. I am certainly not opposed 
to research and inquiry that peers inside the black box to learn 
more about how the methodology works and aims to improve it. 
There are some impressive efforts underway to model 
fingerprint evidence statistically, and this is extremely 
important research that I fully support.160 Of course, fingerprint 
experts should continue to hone their methods, continue to 
work for better understanding of how they could improve their 
processes, and if researchers can help practicing forensic 
scientists to develop validated standards for interpretation to 
increase objectivity, that will be all to the good. All of these 
efforts at better understanding, formalizing methods, and 
improving practices—forms of opening up the black box and 
peering inside—ought to be welcomed, celebrated, and 
encouraged, and perhaps most importantly, funded.  
They just ought not to be necessary requirements for 
admissibility in court. Nor, standing alone, should they be 
sufficient, unless they are also accompanied by evidence that 
these methods, in actual practice rather than in theory, truly 
work. To make the argument by analogy: Which would make a 
driver more comfortable—knowing that there was substantial 
theoretical knowledge suggesting that the brakes on her 
vehicle ought to work, because of a great deal of scientific study 
of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the brakes—or a 
substantial quantity of actual testing of identical vehicles 
showing that the brakes have worked consistently in conditions 
that mirror her situation? While both forms of knowledge are 
valuable, I would posit that the actual, on-the-ground testing, 
quite appropriately gives us a good deal more comfort than the 
theoretical knowledge standing alone.  
  
 160 Neumann et al, supra note 31.  
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I am arguing therefore, that the courts’ central focus, 
especially for a kind of evidence that does not presently have a 
formalized method, should be on testing. Courts should also 
insist upon a close relationship between the testing that has 
been done and the claims that an expert makes. This is what 
Daubert calls the question of “fit” and it is also part of what 
Kumho Tire emphasizes as the need to focus on “the task at 
hand.”161 Strong claims should require strong tests to back them 
up. For example, fingerprint examiners claim to be able to 
individualize—to match a print to one unique source, to one 
finger on one person out of everyone on earth who has ever 
lived or who will ever live.162 There is, as I have already stated, 
not yet sufficient validation to support that claim. Nor do I 
think that proficiency tests of the sort that I am describing and 
suggesting as a prerequisite to admissibility would be sufficient 
to support this claimed ability to individualize. Even with 
excellent proficiency tests, experts would therefore need to 
modulate and moderate the strength of their conclusions to 
some degree. But excellent performance on difficult proficiency 
tests might be sufficient to support a conclusion of a softer sort, 
a conclusion such as, “Based on my knowledge, testing and 
experience, I would not expect to see this degree of similarity 
between two prints unless they came from a common source.” 
This is still, in a way, fudging—for without a working 
statistical model, we cannot have a robust and quantified sense 
of the likelihood two prints with a given degree of similarity 
might have come from different sources. But if we knew that 
examiners in general—and that examiner in particular—had 
succeeded in proficiency tests that required her to make 
difficult identifications and equally difficult exclusions, we 
could legitimately believe that her knowledge and experience 
did adequately support her opinion that they came from a 
common source.  
A signal advantage of focusing on testing rather than 
explanation is that it has the virtue of being manageable, from 
a practical point of view. There are simply no insurmountable 
obstacles to developing appropriately difficult proficiency tests. 
The roadblocks to doing it thus far have been cultural and 
institutional, not scientific. By contrast, developing a valid 
statistical model of fingerprint evidence is a daunting task. 
  
 161 Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 591.  
 162 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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Even with significant research, it likely is years away, perhaps 
even decades. By contrast, proficiency test development could 
be done quite rapidly. And I have little doubt that if courts 
began to exclude fingerprint evidence for the lack of such tests, 
the requisite testing mechanisms would be developed in 
extremely short order.  
Implicit in my argument here for a focus on testing is a 
quasi-“best evidence” approach to the evaluation of expert 
testimony.163 I do not believe that Daubert should be understood 
as requiring a fixed and unchanging amount of evidence in any 
particular area. Rather, the question ought to be whether the 
proffered expert evidence is as reliable as it can reasonably be, 
considering the context and circumstances. Validity under 
Daubert should not be understood as an on/off switch, or as an 
all-or-nothing proposition, in which items of evidence are 
inherently reliable or unreliable. The question for the court is 
whether they are reliable enough—and this depends both on 
what inferences are sought to be drawn from them, and partly 
on whether the evidence offered was as reliable as possible 
under the circumstances. To put it differently, to pass muster 
under Daubert, the judge must have some legitimate 
justification for believing that the evidence is sufficiently 
reliable that a jury should hear it. And the evidence of validity 
should be as strong as it reasonably can be, given the 
circumstances. It is, therefore, partly because proficiency tests 
are genuinely ‘do-able’ that courts ought to require them. 
Concomitantly, courts should hesitate before finding that 
studies or research that are beyond current scientific capacity 
are nonetheless required under Daubert.  
In other words, if an expert—or an entire field—has 
done as much as can reasonably be done to establish validity, 
and our still-imperfect information suggests significant 
probative value, excluding the evidence because our validity 
knowledge is incomplete is not likely to be justice-enhancing—
especially if our knowledge includes reasonable estimates of 
error rate, so that the factfinder can, at least in theory, adjust 
its assessment of probative value accordingly. But by the same 
token, if an expert—or a field—fails to undertake those tasks 
which could reasonably be done to establish validity, and 
  
 163 See generally Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, supra note 151; see also Edward 
Cheng, Mitochondrial DNA: Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2005); Dale 
Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003); 
Dale Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988). 
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instead simply tells the court, “Trust me!” the court should balk 
at the lack of data. Under this approach, evidentiary 
assessment will necessarily be dynamic. A reasonable amount 
of research at Time A may not continue to be adequate at Time 
B, as time passes, and the potential for developing relevant 
data on the salient questions increases.  
It is worth noting that what drives me to a ‘better 
evidence’ principle is very much the same kinds of concerns 
that have motivated Margaret Berger in her important work on 
causation in tort law. Professor Berger has been acutely 
concerned about the difficulties plaintiffs have faced in 
establishing causation in toxic torts cases.164 Throughout her 
career, she has been sensitive to the significant difficulties that 
scientific uncertainty poses for our legal system. In the torts 
context, she has, therefore, searched for ways to protect 
plaintiffs’ interests while simultaneously respecting the need 
for high-quality scientific information within our system of 
adjudication. Professor Berger has offered some insightful and 
creative solutions to the tension between the need for good 
scientific information, and the need to recognize that Daubert 
(at least as interpreted by courts in the pharmaceutical torts 
context) often expects too much. She has therefore searched for 
principled ways around general causation, sometimes through 
the possibility of expanding other kinds of tort claims—like the 
right to informed choice in making a decision about medication, 
or the duty of a company to keep itself informed of risks 
through the pursuit of reasonable research.165 
By contrast, in the forensic science challenges, courts 
have interpreted Daubert as to expect rather too little, instead 
of too much. But the underlying concerns—how do we deal with 
uncertain knowledge, and how can we generate the right 
incentives within the legal system both to do justice and to 
produce better information—are strikingly similar. A ‘better 
evidence’ principle may be our best bet—certainly in the 
forensic science context, but perhaps more generally across the 
board as well, though its potential application in other expert 
contexts goes entirely beyond the scope of this article. 
  
 164 See, e.g., Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards 
a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); Margaret 
Berger, Upsetting The Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme 
Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289 (2001).  
 165 See, e.g., Margaret Berger & Aaron Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
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Neither a focus on testing nor a more general ‘best 
evidence’ approach to expert evidence is a panacea. There will 
still be difficult questions for courts, especially regarding just 
how much testing is required to justify admissibility. I do not 
pretend that answering those questions will be easy or 
straightforward. But they are, I think the right questions for 
courts to ask. They are no doubt challenging questions for 
many judges, most of whom typically lack much background in 
science, and who perhaps went to law school in part precisely 
to stay far away from such technical matters. Judges typically 
therefore will lack epistemic competence—the ability to 
evaluate the knowledge being offered the way an insider to the 
field would evaluate it.166  
Nonetheless, I believe that by focusing on testing, courts 
are less likely to be misled, less likely to be lulled by 
compelling-sounding but as-of-yet unproven explanations, and 
less likely to gloss over remarkable gaps in what is known. 
Testing is a narrower, more tightly bounded inquiry. It 
explicitly directs judges to the question of what data is 
available to support the expert’s conclusions, and to focus on 
the specific fit between the data and the claim. Might judges 
misunderstand a study, fail to notice methodological flaws, or 
misconstrue what inferences can legitimately be drawn from a 
given research result? Absolutely. But at least these errors of 
interpretation would be the result of a focus on the data itself—
which suggests, first and foremost, that there actually is some 
data on the relevant questions. Given our present state of 
affairs, this in itself would be a major improvement.  
In addition, recall that I said at the outset of this article 
that we needed a two pronged solution to our problems of 
forensic science—both stricter scrutiny by the courts and 
greater federal support for research and regulatory oversight. 
Part of why we absolutely need the two-pronged solution is as a 
check on these concerns about the epistemic competence of the 
courts. If there is a research establishment funding work on 
forensic science—including the funding needed both to develop 
proficiency tests, and to evaluate them—it is highly likely that 
academic researchers will increasingly be attracted to the 
study of forensic science. Research follows money like bees 
  
 166 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship and Epistemic 
Confidence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 (2008); see also Scott Brewer, Expert Testimony 
and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L. REV. 1535 (1998); Michael Pardo, The Field 
of Evidence and The Field of Knowledge, 24 LAW & PHIL. 321 (2005). 
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follow pollen. Fund it and they will come. And the structures of 
academic science and social science—with peer review, 
academic evaluation, as well as the review and evaluation that 
could be offered by a new federal agency if one ever were to be 
developed—could all offer a useful check on the quality of the 
proficiency tests that need to be developed.  
There is one final advantage that would result from 
judges taking Daubert seriously in the context of pattern 
identification, and, therefore, either dramatically restricting or 
excluding evidence. At present, virtually no one believes that a 
new federal agency—NIFS, as suggested in the NAS report is 
likely. Whether the federal government will even create a new 
institutional space somewhere within existing federal agencies, 
dedicated to important issues of forensic science, is far from 
certain. There is a serious risk that at the agency level, nothing 
of genuine or transformative import will result from the NAS 
report.  
However, if judges were to begin to take seriously the 
implicit lessons of the report, the odds would change 
dramatically. Why so? Because it would mean that a number of 
important forensic sciences would be likely to find 
themselves—only temporarily, I would expect—excluded from 
the courtroom due to a lack of adequate testing of the validity 
of their results and methods.  
And if that were to begin to happen, what would ensue? 
My strong instinct is that the degree of interest in NIFS or at 
least a more modest surrogate for NIFS within an existing 
agency, would skyrocket. Obviously, the reason for judges to 
apply Daubert meaningfully and therefore likely exclude at 
least some forensic science evidence cannot primarily be to 
incentivize the creation of a federal agency. Judges’ appropriate 
focus is on the particular cases before them, and explicit 
reference to the external incentive effects their decisions might 
generate is not a first priority; even thinking in such terms 
may make some judges uneasy. But in this instance, there is a 
happy convergence: to wit, if the courts begin to do their job 
well, it is likely to help bring about precisely the broader public 
policy initiatives that are also necessary in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
What will the future hold for forensic science? If we look 
back on these methods and techniques twenty years from now, 
what will we see? It is perhaps entirely safe to predict that no 
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matter what happens, the practices of forensic science still 
won’t look like the television version, so my airplane seatmate 
is destined for ongoing disappointment with the real world. But 
I do not think it is utterly unrealistic to hope that the pattern 
identification sciences will be on a much more substantial and 
solid empirical footing than they are today. Ironically, they 
may well look somewhat less strong than they do at present. 
Testifying experts will certainly no longer be able to espouse an 
error rate of zero, and they will likely need to give up the claim 
that they are able to individualize. But by acknowledging their 
weaknesses, and honestly assessing their capacities and 
limitations, they will truly be far stronger than they are at 
present, and far more worthy of credence and respect. Will 
forensic science transform itself as it should? That will depend, 
I believe, in significant part on judges, and whether they are 
prepared, at long last, to evaluate pattern identification 
evidence with their eyes wide open and their heads out of the 
sand.  
For all of our sake, I hope they are up to the challenge. 
